

# Englands Appeal,

FROM THE

PRIVATE CABALLE

AT

WHITE HALL

TO

The Great Council of the Nation;

The Lords and Commons

IN

PARLIAMENT

ASSEMBLED.

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*By a true Lover of his Country.*

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Anno 1673.

Phædrus Lib. i. Fab. V.

*Nunquam est fidelis cum potente societas.  
Testatur hæc fabella Propositum meum.*

**V**acca & Capella et patiens Ovis injurice;  
Socij fuere cum Leone in saltibus.  
Hi cum cepissent Cervum vasti corporis;  
Sic est Locutus, partibus factis, Leo:  
Ego primam tollo nominor quia Leo:  
Secundam, quia sum fortis tribuetis mihi.  
Tum quia plus valeo, me sequetur teria,  
Malo adficietur, si quis quartum tetigerit,  
Sic totam prædam Sola Improbilas abstulit.

Anglice,

**E**ngland! this fable plainly Shew's;  
A strong Allie no Partner know's

**T**He BULL the GOAT, and Patients SHEEP one day,  
Leagu'd with the LYON, sought a Common prey;  
A Prey they took, an high and mighty Hart;  
Of which each thought to have his equal part:  
Soft, quoth the Lyon, I the first share claims;  
'Cause LYON King o' th' Forrest is my name;  
The second you shall give me as my due,  
'Cause I am valiant, able to subdue:  
The third, I take by force, and for the rest,  
Touch it, who dar's, yield it all, you had best.

**T**His is an Age of wonders : And if with a considering eye we take a careful view of Europe, we shall find that some years last past have presented us with as many things worthy of admiration as any former age hath afforded to our forefathers. The Revolution of *Portugal*; and the wonderful secrecy with which it was carried on, is not to be matched in any Age. The Tragy-Comedy of *Massanella* looks more like a Poetical fiction than a real truth. The Deposing of Kings, and (which is much more strange) their Voluntary resignation (of which the Annals of Ancient times furnish us, but with very few examples) are become the common Theame of our Journals, and if from the rest of Europe we turn our eyes toward this Island, our surprisal will increase and we shall find that this little Brittish world is a small *Enchiridion*, or Epitome of all the stupendious events that ever hapned in the great one. We have all seen or had a share in those passages which Posterity will hardly give more credit to, then we do to what is said of King *Arthurs* Round Table. And tis not improbable that some hundred years hence the History of our late revolutions will be ranked among the fabulous Romances of *Gildas* and such other writers.

But it may be among all our unexpected changes, Revolutions; and Counsells, there is scarce any more justly to be wondered at, then the present Alliance with *France*, and the warr we have undertaken, and do still persist to prosecute against *Holland*, in so dangerous an association with the French. It was undoubtedly above the reach of an ordinary understanding to imagine or suspect (in the least) that a Protestant Kingdome, without being compelled to it by some urgent and unavoidable necessity, should ever fight with so much fierceness for the destruction of the Protestant interest : or that English Councillors should advise his Majesty to run the fortune of a French King without a rational prospect of advantage to himself. Would any man that judgeth of

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things according to the ordinary rules of prudence, have thought that in order to the making good our Title to the Kingdom of France, we should able their present King to invade all Christendome and to extend his Empire without bounds, or that to secure to our selves the sovereignty of the Seas, we should with so much industry endeavour to force all the *Dutch Ships*, with all their Naval power into the *French Armies*, and rejoyce at their victories, as if by conquering the land they did not master at the same time their Havens, their Rivers, and their Fleets? We have been often told of brisk messages sent formerly to the *French Kings*, as soon as they did but lay the Carcase of some pittiful Ship upon the Rocks, But we did never so much as dream that Vice Admiralls, and other considerable sea Officers should be sent to the *French Court* to encourage and promote the setting out of their Fleets: That pitying their want of experience in Sea affaires, we would out of a compassionate and brotherly love lead their raw Sea-men by the hand, train them up in our Fleets, and amongst the best of our Sea-men, teach them what skill we have learnt in a long and dear bought experience, And to crown all, even fight for them, and interpose between them and danger and with so good success (as it proved) that the *French Squadron* (as if the engagement had been only designed for an entertainment and diversion to them) came off as fresh and as whole as when they first sayled out of their Ports. The surprising novelty and strangeness of these unexpected Councils bath occasioned the following reflections, And all men being equally concerned in the preservation of the Ship they sayle in, though all do not sit at the Helm, it is every ones duty as well as their undoubted right to prevent as much as they are able, a fatal running upon Rocks, which may chance not to be discerned by others, upon this just and well grounded confidence, I presume to direct these papers to the great Counsel of the Nation, humbly begging that they may be read with an unbyassed mind, and truth weighed in the ballance of the sanctuary. Before all I must premise I do not intend to write an Apology for the Dutch, nor to justify all their proceedings, much less to increale the number of the Scurrulous Pamphlets against them, which I am confident will aff. & no sober man in the Nation, and need only to be read to be confuted, I'll onely say that since all Christians should above all things enquire into the justice of their Arms before they either take them up, or refuse to lay them down. It will become the wisdoms and prudence of both houses to hear what the *Dutch* may



may say for themselves, and to take into their serious consideration the protestations they make both in publick and in private. of their unfeigned desires as well as readiness to give *England* all possible satisfaction, and buy his Majesties Friendship at a more then ordinary rate.

But my present designe being not to enter further into these particulars nor to examine the Justice or injustice of this Warr, but rather to consider and querie (supposing it had been never so just at first) how farr it may be advisable to continue it, I will with as much cleareness as I am able, and in as few words as the matter will bear, confine my self to these following heads.

1. *A Short account of the Crown with which his Majesty is entred into League.*
2. *The necessity, and unavoidable consequences of this Warr.*
3. *Some general reflections upon the whole, with some Account of the manner and steps by which this Warr was both promoted and begun.*

1. All those who are not altogether strangers to the world will easily grant that of al the Kingdoms of Europe there are none but may be said inferiour to *France* in some respect or other, and to want some advantages which *France* enjoyeth in a very eminent degree, The greatness of its Territories, The Populoufness of it, the number of their Gentry and Nobility. Their natural courage; together with the advantage of being trained up either to Military actions or to Warlike exercises, ever since the foundation of their Monarchy, the scituation of their Country, and the oppertunities they have by it to anoy their neighbours upon all occasions, The fruitfulness and riches of the soyle, together with the prodigious quantity of all sorts of commodities manufactured & unmanufactured with which they supply their neighbours, And lastly the great revenues of their Kings, who governing of late without controul or check, are so much the more able to oppress their neighbours; All these advantages meeting together, they have in all ages had aspiring thoughts, and under *Charlemaine* had erected a new Western Empire, which in all likelyhood would have proved of longer continuation, had not those great Dominions been shared and divided between the said *Charlemaines* Children, which in the succeeding Ages proved an occasion of many great and bloody Warrs.

2. A Second and memorable stop to the encrease of the *French* was, when by the ambition of *Hugh Capet* who aimed at the Crown, to usurpe it with less opposition, and to draw the *Grande*s into his party, he made all their governments hereditary and erected them into a kind of Principalities held in *Capite*, from thence sprang so many great Families able afterwards to wage Warr against the *French* King. And whilst they were thus in a kind of Minority, the House of *Burgundy* having joyned with *England*, brought that Kingdome to the Low condition, every one knows.

*Lewis* the 11th. was the first who after the *English* had lost not only their new Conquest, but also what they had possessed of old in *France*, raised the *French* Crown to a greater height, and his Son *Charles* the 8th. besides the acquisition of *Brittany*, frighted all Europe by his surprising conquest of the Kingdom of *Naples*.

This occasioned a general confederacy of all neighbouring Princes against him, whereby he soon lost what he had gotten, But still the ambitious thoughts of his Successors would have much endangered the liberty of Europe, if the *Austrian* family (raised on a sudden to a vast Grandeur by the occasion of an innumerable number of Provinces united in *Charles* the 5th.) had not carried the Imperial Crown from *Francis* the 1st. who stood with much Eagerness for it, and had already engaged several of the Electors.

This having over ballanced the *French* power, the said *Francis* the 1. though helped several times by the great *Solyman* Emperour of the *Turks*, was at last forced to yeild to the victorious Armes of *Charles* the 5th. who took him prisoner and forced him to buy his liberty with a very disadvantageous peace.

But his Son *Henry* the second had better success, and amongst other advantages he added to his Dominions three very fair Imperial and Episcopal Towns, and was likely to have gon further had he not been prevented by a sudden death, *England* all this while (true at that time to their own interest) with a skillful hand holding the ballance and keeping the contesting parties in as great an equality as their own occasions would permit.

Under the minority of his Children, the bloody Massacres and civil warrs, began, which lasted forty years, and would have put an end to that Monarchy if the Ambition of *Phillip* the second would have given way to the dividing of it into the several Principalities, which the respective *Grande*s aimed at.

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But *Henry* the 4th. strengthened by the divisions which grew between the *Spaniards* and the holy League, having won many Battails, made his Title to the Crown good, by the success of his Armes and not long after concluded peace with *Spain* to gain time to breath and to recover new strength.

No sooner was he at rest, but he bent all his thoughts upon a project as vast in the designe of it, as Extraordinary in its nature, intending no less then to cast Europe into a new Mould and to reduce all the Kingdoms, and Common Wealths, that were in his time to a certain number, and to bring them within such bounds as he should prescribe to them, being sure however in this Marshalling to take such share to himself as would have enabled him (or at least his successors) to grow into an universal Monarch.

To effect this he had already made choyce of his Generals and other great Officers, and was preparing both Arms and Money when a sudden and unexpected death put an end as well to his undertaking as to his life.

The beginning and in truth the greatest part of the Reign of *Lewis* the 13th. his Son was much disquieted by intestine broyles and Civil Warrs, during which the house of *Austria* was very neer bringing all *Germany* under their subjection, and after the Battel of *Prague* stood very faire for the universal Empire. But *France* having at last quieted all at home, did (under the pretence of opposing the *Austrian* Family, and whilst they were courted by several Princes to assist and protect them against the Emperour) vastly encrease their own power, and conquered new Provinces, and considerable Towns in *Spain*, *Italy*, *Germany*, and the *Low Countreys*, which raising a new jealousy in their own Allies occasioned the peace of *Munster* to prevent their further progress.

About the same time the new Civil Warrs which broke out in *France* under the minority of the present King gave opportunity to *Spain* to recover part of their Losses, till the (late) Protector of *England* joyning with the *French* (for the advancement of some private ends of his own, & by a policy from which the destruction of Europe may chance to take it's date before we are much older) brought them into a decaying condition, and made the *Pyrenean* Peace (after the death of *Cromwell*) most wellcome to them.

Before we go further and come to give a more perticular account of  
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the present *French* Court, I will beg leave to stop here a while And desire the reader to take along the following inferences, from what hath already been hinted, a more full knowledge thereof being left to the perusal of their Histories.

1. That no greater proofs can be given of the internal strength of the *French* Nation, then their overcoming the many dangerous convulsions of State, they have from time to time strugled, with which in all appearance would have destroyed any other Nation.

2. That in all Ages, as soon as their intestine troubles have been over, they have still out of a restless and Warlike humour endeavoured to encroach upon their neighbours and to encrease their own Dominions laying hold of all oportunities to disturb man-kind and having never been able as yet to set bounds to their Ambition.

3. That this Ambitious humour of theirs, supported by the greatness of their power would long before this time have brought all Europe under their subjection, if their own divisions and private quarrels had not from time, to time, put back their designs for many years, or their greatest Princes been cut off before they could finish their intended work.

4. And Lastly as a consequence of the three former, that it was ever, and will be still, the true interest of Europe to oppose the *French* designs, or if there be any occasion of making use of them against some other oppressors, not to accept of their assistance, longer or further then publick utility requires it, nor to suffer them to proceed after the danger is over, as it was practiced in the peace of *Passaw*, in the time of *Henry* the 2. and that of *Munster*, in both which the *French* were stopped in their full careers by their own Allies, though they still came off with profit.

The *French* having thus in the last Warrs, added many fair Provinces, and Towns to their Territories; this present Court had no sooner made Peace with *Spain*, but they thought of laying the foundations of a vaster Empire then ever, And perceiving that since the discovery of the *Indies*, and increase of Trade, Naval strength was the most important of all others, and Navigation and commerce the greatest (if not the only) supporters of it, They first erected and encouraged several Trading Companies, and in the second place they spared no cost and stuck at no charge or expence, to purchase a considerable Fleet of men of Warr wherein they have been so successful, That I fear their  
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Fleet (excepting the true courage of our Sea-men) is not much inferior to that of his Majesties, as incredible as it may seem at first, considering how few years they have applied themselves to it.

But whilst they were thus intent upon the increase of their interest at Sea, they let no opportunity slip, of enlarging their Empire at Land, for during the late Warr with *Holland*, they invaded in (1667.) and mastered a considerable part of the *Spanish Low-Countries* in 1669. they hunted the poor Duke of *Lorraine* out of his Dutchy, and to this day possess it all and now this last year they have conquered halfe the United Provinces, Much less then all this was more then sufficient to awaken all Europe, and his Majesty above all others being out of his Princely wisdom very sensible that the keeping a true balance between the Princes and other states of Europe, was the onely security of all, and that by a timely stop to the *French* conquests he would reape an infinite honour and profit. As soon as the *French* King fell upon *Flanders*, he began to think of applying fitt remedies to so dangerous a disease, and having concluded a Peace at *Breda* with the *Hollanders*, he sent to them in private in January 1668. Sir *William Temple*, who was then his Resident at *Brussels*, to propose a nearer Alliance with them, and to take joynt measures against the *French*.

“ No small Argument by the way, of his Majesties aversion to the  
 “ *French* designs, and of the fear he had of their increase, since to  
 “ prevent it, he went so far as to seek the *Hollanders* first, and to pro-  
 “ pose stricter Alliances with them after so fierce and Resent a Warr en-  
 “ ded with the unpleasant circumstances of *Chatham*.

*Sir William Temple* proposalls having been entertained with all ready compliance by the *Dutch*, he waited on his Majesty to give him an account of his Negotiation, And within five days after he was sent back to the *Hague* with all necessary powers and instructions, by virtue of and in conformity to which he concluded and agreed upon, two several Treaties with the *Dutch*, the one a defensive and stricter League than before between the two Nations; And the other a joynt and reciprocal engagement, to oppose the conquest of *Flanders*, and to procure either by way of Mediation or by force of Armes, a speedy peace between *France* & *Spain*, upon the Terms therein mentioned, & because *Sweden* came unto the same Treaty very little after, from the three parties concerned

o ucernd, and engaged, it was called the Triple League. In perſuance of this, the Treaty of *Aix la Chapel* was forced upon the *French*, and in ſome manner upon the *Spaniards*, who were very unwilling to give away by a ſolemn Treaty ſo great a part of their Country. But both his Maſteſty and the *Hollanders* thought it a very great and good work, and judged it a great happineſs not only for *Spain*, but for all Europe to come off with a broken Pate, and to have at leaſt for that while kept *France* from going further.

This was repreſented to the Parliment with all the advantages of Language, and nothing was omitted in the reſpective ſpeeches of his Maſteſty himſelf, the Lord *Keeper*, and many private Members, that could make both Houſes (and with them the whole Kingdom) ſenſible of the great ſervice done to *England*, and in a manner to all mankind by chaining up a devouring *Lyon*, who was never ſatiated with prey.

This Triple League grew ſo famous that it proved the politick Inſtitute of our Juſtinian. In the name of the Triple League, and of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapel*, ſeveral ſubſidies were both demanded & granted, for 2. or 3. Millions together, The Triple League ſtoped or annul'd all Inpeachments: for its ſake inquiries into miſcarriages were laid aſide. And the Parliamēt did conceive they could neither give nor forgive too much, if by their compliaunce they could but contribute ſome what towards binding the *French* to their good behaviour.

Befides this, to tie the Knot faſter, and take even the very thoughts from the *French* King, of ever ſtirring or being troubleſome to his neighbours, his Maſteſty ſent an Extraordinary Envoy to ſeveral Princes of *Germany*, to invite them into the Triple League: His Miniſter to perſwade them to it, laying open, with no leſs beate than plainneſs, the danger all Europe was in. The inſenſibility of moſt Princes, and their careleſſneſs, The watchful ambition of the *French*, the greatneſs of their forces, And the little reaſon one had to truſt them. In fine, omitting nothing that could Alarime all the world, and procure a general confederacy againſt the common oppreſſor; Nay, to evince and demonſtrate (beſides all we have ſaid now) that this Triple League was not entred into out of a particular reſpect, or perſonal kindneſs to the *Spaniard* (not to ſpeake now of the miſunderſtanding and Jarring between *England* and *Spain* in the *West Indies*) the ſaid *Spaniards* being very much wanting to themſelves, by their backwardneſs in the payment of the ſubſidies promiſed to *Sweden*. His Maſteſty not to be wanting to Europe,



Europe, and consequently to his own Kingdoms, out of the deep sense he had of the necessity of preserving the Triple-League entire, and being not without fears, the *Swedes* might fall off, unless the Money agreed upon was paid them, without further delay; he offered in *September or October* 1668. to advance himself part of it, and had accordingly done it in case the *Dutch* would have advanced the rest.

All this doth abundantly shew what opinion his Majesty and his Council were used to have of *France* as well as both Houses, and the rest of Nation: And therefore without considering how things came to be altered (which we may take hereafter some notice of) we may lay down as an Undeniable *English* Principle, and a Maxime never to be swerved from: That *France* is no waies to be suffered to grow great, much less to have their designs promotid, as it is plain to all mankind they are now.

But we must go somewhat further, and there being nothing more dangerous then to join in any ambitious designe with a Prince against whom we can no waies secure our selves, in case he break his word to us, it will not be amiss to consider how far one may rely upon the Candor and integrity of the *French Court*, and what may rationally be expected from their generosity.

In Order to this, since the heart of man is not known otherwise then by a careful observation of their Actions, and that we cannot judge of things to come but by Inferences and Arguments drawn from those that are past; the best way to satisfy our selves is to take a short survey of the carriage and conduct of the *French Court* for these last 13. Years, during which they have had still the same Ministers, who are not like to Act henceforth upon any other Principles, or by other Methods then they have done hitherto, and they having been brought up in so good a School as that of *Cardinal Mazarin* whose motto was that An honest man ought not to be a slave to his word, it must not be wondered at, if they do still as much as they are able, influence their present Master and endeavour to persuade him that.

*Si Violandum est jus, Regnandi causa Violandum est.*

The first proof of the honesty both of the Cardinal himself, and of his Disciples, is their Carriage in the *Pirenean Treaty* & their performance of what was most Essential in it, wherein is to be observed that.

By the endeavours of the *Queen Mother of France*, a peace being promoted between the two Crowns, with a Marriage between the

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*French*



*French King* and the *Infanta* of *Spain*, the whole Treaty was grounded upon two considerable points, which till granted by *France*, had still binded the conclusion of that great work, the one, was the forsaking of *Portugal*, and the other a renunciation of the *Infanta*, (consented to and ratified by the *French King*) of all his present and future Pre-*tences*, *Titles* or *Claimes* whatsoever to the *Spanish Monarchy* and *Dominions* thereof, or to any part of the same: "Least, saith the Treaty, The *Glory* of their respected Kingdoms should come to decay, and be diminished if by reason and through the said Marriage they came to be united and joyned, in any of their Children, and Posterity, which would occasion to the Subjects and Vassalls, such troubles and afflictions as might easily be imagined.

As to the first, viz. the exclusion and forsaking of *Portugal*. The words of the Treaty are these, His said Majesty (the *French King*) will intermeddle no further in the said Business, and doth promise and oblige himself upon his honour, upon & the faith & word of a King, both for himself and his successors, not to give, neither in common nor to any Person or Persons thereof in Particular of what Dignity, Estate or Condition soever, either at present or for the future, any help or assistance, neither publick nor secret, directly nor indirectly, of men, Arms, Munitions, Victualling, Vessels nor money, under any pretence, nor any other thing whatsoever, by Land or by Sea, nor in any other manner, as likewise not to suffer any Levies to be made in any part of his Kingdom, and Dominions nor to grant a passage to any that might come from other Countries to the Relief of the said Kingdom of *Portugal*.

I suppose all the World will grant, it were hard for the wit of man, to find out, or so much as imagine stronger words, or fuller expressions in a Treaty, to prevent what the *Spaniards* were so much afraid of, viz. the Assistance of *Portugal*, Let us now see how it was performed.

As soon as this was agreed on, and before the Treaty was signed Cardinal *Mazarin* (still resolved as well in this as upon all other occasions, not to be *Esclave De sa parole*) sent privately the Marquis the *Chonpas* into *Portugal*, to assure them that in Order to the conclusion of the Treaty then on foot with *Spain*, they were forced to leave them out, and to engage not to assist them: but that whatever they promised they would never forsake them, and would

still

still protect them against *Spain* as much as they had done before. The truth is, they kept their word to *Portugal*, much better then they did to *Spain*. And the Peace was no sooner made, but they sent them the usual supplies of Men, Arms and Money, And a while after notwithstanding their former Treaty with *Spain*, and in the view of the whole world, they entred into an Offensive League with that Kingdome against all their Enemies, whereby, amongst other things, the *French* were to have all the Sea-Towns that should be taken from *Spain* delivered to them, All which with many other particulars, too long to be inserted in this short discourse, may be seen more at large, in the incomparable Books of the *Baron de l'Isola*; intituled the Buckler of State and Justice which to this day could not be answered by the *French*, though often challenged (and so much concerned in honour) to do it.

The other security of the *Piranean* Treaty as to *Spain*, and that without which they could never have given their consent to their Marriage of the *Infanta*, was the Renunciation before mentioned, And whoever reads it will be apt to think, a General Council of the *Civilians* was called, to outdo all former Expressions used in such contracts, and to find out new binding Clauses, to take of all possibility of Evasion. And to make it more sacred yet and more inviolable, There being no greater tie upon Sovereign Princes then that of Publique and solemn Treaties, the Act of the Renunciation was incorporated into the very Treaty of Peace, to make up of both of them but one body; though digested unto different Instruments as is expressly declared in the 33. Article of the Treaty of Peace, wherein speaking of the Contract of Marriage, to which they refer themselves, these words are added, which though it be separated hath the same force and vigour with the present Treaty of Peace, as being the principal part thereof, and the most precious pawn of its greater security and lasting.

But the *French Lawyers* preferring the little quirks of Law before publique faith; And pretending they might bring the Authority of solemn Treaties (which are the true, and indeed the only Law between Sovereign Princes) under the Cavil of *Municipal Laws*, and Local Customs, endeavouring to perswade the World that their Master was not bound to stand to what he had so solemnly promised and confirmed by sacred Oaths: And the French King after the death of the late King of *Spain*, claimed (notwithstanding the said Renunciation)

association) a great part of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, as being devolved to him in right of his Wife, by the *Municipal Lawes* of those Countries; And to back his unexpected Claime with more effectual meanes, he Invaded the Country with a powerful Army.

This Invasion, so contrary to his Engagements, and so destructive to the very essence of the *Pirenean Treaty*, was attended with some circumstances, no less surprising than the breach it self.

The one was what passed at *Paris* between the *French King* himself, and the *Marquis De la Fuente* Extraordinary Ambassador from *Spain*; And the other, what the *French Ambassador* (the *Arch Bishop of Ambrun*) declared at *Madrid* in his Masters name.

As to the First, The said *Marquis De la Fuente* being upon his Return into *Spain*, after the Death of the late King his Master, and being not without apprehension and jealousy, the great preparations, made in *France* were intended against the Queen his Mistress, and the King her Son, was very earnest with His Most Christian Majesty, to give some new and greater Assurances to the Queen of *Spain*, of the reality and sincerity of his intentions to quiet and settle her mind, against all the contrary advices, she received from all parts; whereupon the most Christian King did, with all possible Assurance, engage his Faith and his Royal Word, to the said Queen, that he would Religiously keep the Peace, and continue a faithful friendship both to her and to her Son.

And the *Arch Bishop of Ambrun*, after the *French Army* was already in the Field, and had possessed *Charleroy*, some four or five days before the News of it came to *Madrid*; did in *Verbo Sacerdotis*. And upon all that is most sacred amongst the *Roman Catholics*, protest and vow to the Queen, that his Master intended nothing less, than what was reported of him: And would never break with the King of *Spain*, or invade his Dominions as long as he was under Age.

But the March of the *French Army*, and the Hostilities they committed, agreeing so little with their promises, and the same being complained of; They answered, it was no Breach, and that they only went to take possession of what belonged to them.

This Warr, or as the *French* term it; this friendly possessing themselves of the *Spanish* Dominions, ended by the Treaty of *Aix*. After which, contrary to the Treaty it self; they first dismantled all the

the strong Places and Holds of the County of *Burgundy*! carried away all the Munitions out of the Country, and would have destroyed the rich Salt Pits of that Province, had not the powerful Interposition both of *England*, *Holland*, prevented that Spoil.

Notwithstanding the same Treaty of *Aix*, they exacted great Contributions from the Dutchies of *Lymbourg*, and *Luxembourg*; They lay a new claim to some Towns, as important as any of those that have been granted to them by the Peace: They have confiscated the Estates of the Subjects of the King of *Spain*, that would not forswear their Allegiance; and have not spared the very Royal House of *Mary Mont*: Nay, as if these infractions were not sufficient and still to encroach as far as they were able, they forced their way with great quantities of Merchandise through the *Spanish* Territories without paying the Customes, and not long after endeavoured to surprize the Town of *Mons* in *Hainault*.

Thus they have dealt with *Spain* ever since the *Pirenean Treaty*.

Let us see now, how other Princes have fared with them; we'll begin with the Duke of *Lorraine*.

By the *Pirenean Treaty*, the said Duke was to be restored to his Dutchy of *Lorraine*, with all the Places and Towns which he had possessed in the Bishopricks of *Metz*, *Toul* and *Verdun*. \*But *France* after the execution of the other Articles of the said Treaty, deferred as long as they could the performance of that part, which related to the Duke, and refused still to return him his Country; till they had brought him to make another Treaty with them, whereby he was forced to part with several considerable places over and above what had been granted to them by the general Peace; Then after a year and an half of an unsettled possession, during which under several unjust pretences, new quarrels were picked every day: They forced him with a considerable Army, to give them his Town of *Marshall*.

And not long after, they again compelled him to sign a new Treaty; more disadvantageous yet then the two former; since which he could, as little as before have a quiet enjoyment of that little they had left him. They every day encroached upon his jurisdiction, the Limits of his Territories, and his Sovereignty it self; They laid enormous

enormious Taxes upon his Subjects, They caused him to disband his Forces, and to raise new men again as they thought fit, They kept him from revenging his own quarrells, to take part in that of others, They let loose all his Enemies against him, and stopped the Progress of his Armies, as soon as he had the least advantage, And in few words he was all that while more a Vassall to *France*, then a Sovereign. But yet all this would not satisfie the *French Court*, And taking it ill that his Obedience was not altogether so blind as they would have it, they ordered one of their Generals to seize his Person, and to bring him either dead or alive, As it was very near being effected, A new way of dealing with a Sovereign Prince, not known, yet in these parts of the World, and which may give some hopes to Europe of seeing ere long the West Governed by *Barbans* as well as the East.

The Kingdom of *Poland* comes next, which hath layn a bleeding ever since they have had a *French Queen*, & which is at this instant in an eminent danger of being conquered by the *Turks*, through the means of the *French Cabals*, who have called into the Kingdom the Enemy of the Christian name merely because they could not have a King either of *French blood*, or of *French interest*.

The Duke of *Newburg* was not much better used, And whilst they caused him to engage the greatest part of his Estate almost beyond redemption in hopes of the *Polish Crown*, which they had promised to raise him to by the help of a strong party, they had made in that Kingdom. They underhand contrary both to their Treaties (as well with the *Electors of Brandenburg* as with himself) and to their reiterated promises and vows both by word of mouth and in writing, did by their Creatures and Agents Oppose the said Dukes pretentions, and endeavoured with all industry to have the Prince of *Conde* preferred before all his Competitors. A Particular deduction whereof will (if ever published) without any other Instance be a sufficient warning to all Princes, And give them a Perfect Character of the *French Court*.

The *Emperour* hath a little reason to thank them, And at the very time the most *Christian King* sent him forces to joyn with his Army against the *Turks*, they began to settle a Correspondence with the *Count Serin*, *Franchipany*, *Nadasti*, and *Totenback*, from whence their so well known, Conspiracy hath since broken out, As hath appeared by the depositions and confessions of some of the Accomplishes who had been instrumental in carrying both Money and Letters, from the *French Minister* at *Vienna* to the said Conspirators. Not

Not to speak now of what arts they used to hinder his Election at first, (And since that to lessen his Authority and disturb all *Germany* by their Intrigues and private Treaties with several Privaes contrary to the Treaty at *Munster*.

To which may be added, that one of the great Motives of bringing the *Turky* into *Poland* was the marriage of the *Emperors* Sister with their King.

Yet it must be owned also that the *French* seem to have repented their pernicious intrigues & Caballing in that Kingdome, for when they saw the *Emperor* preparing in Earnest to assist the *Dutch*, to diswade him from that designe, & to engage him (if it had been possible) not to concern himself or take part in the Quarrel, they very fairly offered him to put into his hands and deliver him all the Original Letters they had from their Creatures and freinds in *Poland*, To the end both his *Imperial Majesty* and the *King of Poland*, his Brother might take what course they thought fit with those Rebels: A fair warning to all those that prefer *French* money before their Loyalty, and the true interest of their Country.

Nay I doubt the *Swedes*, their good Freinds have not always been pleased with them. And they cannot to this day forget that some ten Years since, having made a Treaty with the *French* whereby they were to receive, by way of Gratuity or Pension, Sixteen hundred Thousand Crowns, the *French* (upon second thoughts) finding their Treaty with *Sweden* of little use to them refused to ratifie it, & sent them *Monsieur de Trelon*, who, without more words told them in short, That the King his Master declared it to be void, A fine Curt stile for one Prince to use to another! And a short Majestick way of Rescinding all Treaties.

It were both needless and tedious, to examine now how well they have observed their Treaties with *Holland*, since they cannot so much as assigne the least cause of the Warr they make now, and in their declaration tell us onely of a *Mauvaise satisfaction* of their being ill pleased, which would tend to the Diminution of the glory of a most *Cbristian King*, unless to please himself better, he put Europe in a Flame and endeavour to bring all under his subjection.

But it may be thought all other Princes and States have had much cause to complain of the *French* not to say worse, his Majesty hath been hitherto either more fortunate or more beholding to their generosity and Kindness. This must be now inquired into, I will not in-

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first much upon the expressions of their kindness to his Majesties Person, whilst he was abroad, since they may pretend the Interest of their Kingdom, and palliate their dures and inhumane dealing, by a necessity of preserving themselves, But I hope no such necessity compell'd them to oppose his Majesties happy restoration with so much violence as they did, and to Caball with his greatest Enemies to keep him out of his Kingdoms, which his Majesty was so sensible of, that upon his coming into *England* he commanded away the *French Embassoder Bordeaux*, and would not suffer him to come into his presence.

Since that time they have often endeavoured to ingratiate themselves, and have made great protestations. But after several propositions of Leagues, and many arts used to raise Jealousies between us and the *Hollanders* (Dreading nothing more then a durable and firm friendship between two Nations, who if united might easily set what bounds they pleased to their ambition) they at last sided with the *Dutch*, though with no other intention then to see us destroy each other, or at least so far weaken and exhaust our selves, that they might with less opposition invade their Neighbours, and increase their Naval strength, nay their policy went further, and in the very heat of the Warr they still kept Negotiations on foot, and made overtures and proposals of peace by means of the late *Queene Mother*, whom in the end they deceived so far, as to assure her (and by her his Majesty) that the *Dutch* would set no Fleet out (that Summer, the peace was concluded) whilst underhand they pressed the said *Dutch* with all the Vigour and earnestnes imaginable to fit out their Ships, with a promise of joyning theirs to them.

Upon this Paroll of the *French Court* 'tis too well known we had no Fleet out, as well as what followed upon it, when the *Dutch* meeting with no opposition, entered into the River of *Chatham*; so that though the *French* had no other hand in't, they had been still the true cause of that unhappy accident: But withal, it is more then probable they were themselves the Authors of that Counsel, and most certain it is they knew of the design before the attempt was made: As might be proved by several instances if necessary:

After this, the Peace being concluded at *Breda*, the *French* were by the Treaty, to return us *St. Christophers*, in the manner and form therein expressed. But instead of performing it according to the true meaning (and the very Letter of the Article) they have still from time to time, upon several unjust and frivolous pretences, put off his Majesties



jesties Commissioners that went to receive it; till seeing a necessity of complying with us in so small a matter, whilst we were preparing to run so great a danger for their sake; they delivered it at last to Sir *Charles Wheeler*, somewhat above a year since. But before the delivery of it, they had destroyed all the Plantations, plundered and carried away all that was portable; laid the whole Country waste, And left it in a much worse condition, than if it had never been Planted. And as if the detaining of his Majesties Territories had not been sufficient, they interrupted the Trade of his Subjects in those parts; and assuming to themselves the Sovereignty of those Seas; they would not suffer any Ships but their own, to Sail by, or about their *Islands*. And in Truth upon no other Ground, have brought in as Prizes, and confiscated several Vessels. Not to speak now of the great discouragement our *French Trade* hath many years since lain under; through their unjust practices and manifold devices, which have been such, that we do not of late send into *France* the fourth or fifth part of what Goods and Commodities were formerly sent over.

This late carriage of theirs in *América*, brings us to their present Alliance with his Majesty. And as the greatest care of those that have advised the King to this League, have been to keep from the view and from the knowledge of the World, what *Articles* are agreed upon. It is not to be expected we should instance in the particular Breaches of what we are all strangers to; for Example, we cannot tell whether it was agreed the *French Squadron* should fight, and so dare not assure they have broken their Treaty by not fighting. But I suppose there are very few, but have heard of the Wager laid by the *Spanish Ambassador* in the beginning of the War, And how far the *French Conduct* agreed with his Predictions. I would not neither impeach any man upon general Reports and Rumors, but however it is observable, That the greatest number of the *Dutch Commanders* are of Opinion, and have often publickly declared, That the *French Ships* were thus kindly used by theirs out of a particular respect *De Wits Brother* had to them.

If from the Sea we come a shore, we'll find (as far at least as they came to our knowledge) most of their promises deceitful; all the Art imaginable used to ensnare his Majesty.

And lastly, a perfect and reiterated Breach, of the essence of their Treatie, whatever the words may be; All those that have been never

so little conversant at Court, may remember that one of the great Arguments used and suggested by the *French*, to make the conquest of *Holland* appear both safe and easie; was that his most *Christian Majesty* had assurances from all the great Princes in *Europe*; they would no ways concern themselves in the Quarrel: *Spain* would be glad to see their old Rebels chastised, The Emperor had his hands full, and durst not stir if he would for fear of the *Turks*. *Brandenburg* should demand his Towns, and the *Northern Crowns*, would either sit still or endeavor to have a share in the spoyle. And this was foreadily embraced, that even after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty betwixt *Spain* and the *United Provinces*; they would not own there was so much as any agreement. And for a good while we flattered our selves, That the Leagues with the *Catholick King* and other Princes, were surmises of the *Dutch*, to raise their Reputation, and quiet the minds of their People. But when this wast past denying, they came off with slighting discourses of the Forces of the *Dutch Allies*; and *Monsieur de Turenne* would cut them all to pieces, if ever their Temerity did bring within his reach.

At the Rate the Alliance with *France*, was discoursed off before the War broke out, standers by could not but think (and I believe if Truth were enquired into, it will be found his Majesty intended no more at first, and was engaged no farther,) the *French* should be the Principal in this War, and England joyn their Forces with them as *Auxiliaries*, to have still in case of need, a safe and honourable Retreat in their Power. But as soon as the *French* thought his Majestie could not well go back nor take new Counsels; they openly declared it was none of their Quarrel, and that they only engaged in it to assist his Majesty, out of respect to his person. By which means his Majesty was perswaded and induced to declare War first, and to expect afterwards the assistance of the *French*.

• I suppose his Majesty will not thank them neither for giving out in all *Roman Catholick* Princes Courts, That this is a War of Religion, undertaken meerly for the propagation of the *Catholick Faith*, and as the *French* Minister at *Vienna*, expressed it in a solemn Speech to the Emperors Council, which hath been since Printed in *French*, that the *Hollanders* being *Hereticks*, who had forsaken their God; all good Christians are bound to joyn and unite to extirpate them and to implore Gods blessing upon so good a work. Nay to confirm this  
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the more they have lately declared and assured many Princes that to let *Europe* see how far they are from any such design as have been laid to their Charge; and to satisfie all the World, they entred into this War out of a Religious Zeal; and for the Glory of God, they are ready to part with all their Conquests, and return to the *Hollanders* all the Towns they have taken from them; if they will but re-establish the true Worship they have banished from their Territories.

How far now this may be agreeable to his Majesties Interest, or to the *XXXIX Articles*; let any unprejudiced man judge.

But an undeniable proof of the uprightness of the *French Court*, is their carriage in the Negotiations of Peace with the *States*: In short, the matter of Fact is thus:

The passage of the *French Army* over that Branch of the *Rhine*, called the *Waell*; having caused a general consternation all over the Country, and the confusion they were in, being such, that they could hardly resolve whether to yield or defend themselves.

The *States* on the 11th. of *June*, named several *Deputies* to be sent, some to his Majesty, and the rest to the *French King*; to know of them both upon what terms they would be willing to agree and come to a Peace:

Those that came to his Majesty, were met upon the way as far as *Graves End*, to forbid them the Court, and were conveyed to *Hampton Court*; there to continue in an honourable confinement, till we could hear from the most *Christian King*, and know of him whether the said *Deputies* might be admitted; his Majesty being unwilling to give the least offence to the *French*; And not thinking it either lawful or convenient (without their participation) so much as to hear what the *Dutch Deputies* Errand was.

But the other *Deputies* came no sooner to the *French Court*, but two *Secretaries of State* were sent to them, and without further delay, desired to know first if they had full Power to Treat; and in the next place, what the *States* could propose in order to a speedy Peace. The *Deputies* answered, they were only sent to know his Most *Christian Majesties* Pleasure, and that their Masters had thought it a greater respect to him to receive his Proposals then to offer any Conditions themselves, with this answer; the *French Ministers* went to their Masters, and came back immediately to the *Deputies*, to let them know, it was expected the *States* should make the Proposals, and that the most

*Christian King* could not enter upon any Treaty unless they had full Power. Telling them withal (to quicken them and to hasten the conclusion of the work) that they were to consider, That whatever his most *Christian Majesty* had Conquered, was already his own; and therefore he could no way part with it, unless they gave him an Equivalent, as well for what he might Conquer farther, before the Conclusion of the Treaty, as for what he possessed at that time: Whereupon *Monsieur de Groot* (one of the *Deputies*) being gone to the *Hague*, he was sent back with all speed, and authorised in a very ample manner together with his Collegues to treat and conclude a Peace with the *French*.

Upon the return of the said *De Groot*; with the Powers after some conferences (part of them with *De Groot* alone) *Monsieur de Louvois*, one of the *Secretaries of State* gave the *Dutch Deputies* a project of a Treaty, or rather the pretensions of the King his Master: Upon the granting of which, he was both willing and ready to return to his former Amity with the *States*, and conclude a firm Peace with them.

Wherupon two things are to be observed; The one that the Conditions were such, that (if granted) would have made the *French King* as perfectly Master of the Country, as if he had conquered all by the Sword: and the other, that in all the *Articles* (which are still in being and may be produced if need be) there was not the least word relating to *England*; and no more notice taken of his Majesty, or greater care of his interest, then if he had not been concerned in the War, or in no League with the *French*. So that if by a wonderful providence of God, the said Treaty, had not been unexpectedly broken off. *Europe* had in one day lost it's Liberty; And all we could have expected afterwards, had been the favour *Polyphemus* shewed to his Guests.

And to demonstrate further, that the intention of the *French Court*, was not his Majesty should be a gainer by the War, *Monsieur de Groot* (whose word if he be not very much wronged ought to go a great way when he speaks of the *French*) declared at his second coming to the *Hague*, with the before mentioned Articles that the *French Ministers* had answered him, the *States* his Matters might deal as they pleased with *England*, and come off as cheap as they would, because (as they pretended) they were not bound or engaged by their Treaty to procure them

them any advantage. A happy thing in the means while to be engaged in such a Warr, with so Generous an *Allie*.

While this negotiation was on foot, and before the Treaty could be Concluded; the Prince of *Orange* was miraculously restored to the dignity and authority of his Ancestors, which having altogether Eclipsed the party that was inclined to treat with *France* upon almost any Terms, and the rest of the Country being all under Water, the *French* lost at once both their hopes of carrying the whole matter by a Treaty, and the opportunity of making a further Progress by their Armes.

At the same time My Lord Duke of *Buckingham* and my Lord *Arlington* went into *Holland*. And the *French* who knew already they could neither bring the *Dutch* to a compliance, nor Swim over to the remaining Townes, And with all being full of Apprehension and fear that by the Authority of the Prince of *Orange*, and through the interest he was like to have in his Majesty (chiefly if their practices and honest dealings came to be discovered) a Seperate peace might be made between *England* and the *United Provinces*, they Acted their part so successfully with our Plenipotentiaries, that they perswaded them to enter (in his Majesties name) into a new engagement, not to treat or conclude with the *Dutch* any Peace or Truce without them: For as to their promising the like, it was a perfect mockery on their part, since they had already done their utmost to Treat without *England*, and that after they had miscarried in the attempt, nothing could secure them but his Majesties refusing to accept of what conditions the *Dutch* would be willing to grant Him.

After this new Contract made, our Plenipotentiaries together with the *French Ministers* sent their joynt demands, and proposalls to the *Dutch*, to be granted in Tenn daies or else no Peace to be made, which was the next Master-piece of the *French*, for it is to be observed, first that the *French* Demandt were in substance the same as they had made at first in their negotiation with Monsieur *de Groote*, And since they were so unjust, and so Enormious, that the best friends they had then amongst the States could hardly swallow them themselves, (much less to bring the generality to give their consent) without some Modification It was not to be expected that the Government being since the late Change, much more averse to the *French* then before, the same proposalls again, should be better entertained, which was rendred the more improbable by the addition of the *Engish* demands.

Secondly.

*Secondly, The French, by the excessive height of their demands, seemed to have encouraged (if not perswaded by some more effectual means) the said Plenipotentiaries not to come much short of them, which was attended with Two Fatal consequences, the one, that the Warr was certainly, by it, entayled upon his Majesty, And the other that it was a meanes to alienate the mindes and affections of the Dutch, who were then inclined to give those advantages to England, which cannot rationally be expected hereafter.*

*Thirdly. Though the respective claimes of the Two Kings had been singly tolerable; yet the ioyning of them together made it impossible, for the Dutch to grant either. From whence the French (and very rationally) conceived hopes that the Dutch finding themselves over balanced by the joynt power of their Enemies, and seeing no way to come out of so destructive a Warr, and to have peace (and not a firm nor a durable one neither) without dividing their Country into a hundred pieces, and cutting of all their Sinews, Had rather cast themselves into the Arms of their Conquerour and laying aside all thoughts of Sovereignty; live in an entire Body under the French Domination. At least it were some comfort, if the French Court had but kept to this last agreement, which in so many respects was advantageous to them, But, that they have not done neither: And as soon as they saw most Princes in Europe, begin to be in Earnest, and that great succours were preparing for the Assistance of the Dutch, besides what forces were already in the Field, They underhand made new overtures of Peace, and have still to this day been sending privat Messages to the Dutch, wherein they take no greater care of England than they had done at *Utrecht*, And if the Dutch had not persisted in their refusal to Treat without their Allies, the French had long since concluded without theirs, and that upon very moderate Terms, as to the Dutch.*

I suppose this will seeme very strange, and will hardly be credited, but since as long as I am under this disguise, I cannot iustifie it as fully as otherwise I might do it, All I can say at present is, there are those in the Kingdom that know the truth of it as well as my self, and I hope the world will not be long without a full discovery of it, And thus I end the first part of this discourse which hath swelled unawares into a greater bulk then I intended at first, though the matter would bear a great deal more without being exhausted.

Let



Let us now come to the *Second Head*, and examine what the issue of this Warr may prove and what may rationally be expected, it will come to.

Were it either possible in nature, or so much as to be imagined that *Holland* might be turned into a new Lake, their Towns burnt and depopulated, and their Inhabitants either destroyed or Transported into remote Colonies, or part of them brought into this Kingdome, to encrease the Number of our People; I fear no Arguments drawn from either natural Justice or Christian Charity could be forceable enough to put a stop to such a designe: And in this case it would be hard for the ingenious and worthy Author of the Interest of *England* stated (as unanswerable as his Arguments are) to perswade men either Biassed, or not very well acquainted with the state of Forreigne Affairs, That it must be the chief Interest of *England* to support the present Government of *Holland*.

But such a destruction being not to be thought on, or expected by any man that is in his Wits, and since the Situation of the Country, and its Commodiousness for trading in many respects, together with the Natural and Laborious Industry of the Inhabitants, will still continue under any change. To satisfy our selves how far we may be gainers by this Warr, we must consider in order to the general events that may be looked upon as in any degree of possibility.

In order to that I conceive all men will grant one of these four things must be supposed.

*First*. The absolute conquest of the *United Provinces* by the *French*. Or?

*Secondly*. Our Conquering of them.

*Thirdly*. A Division and Sharing of the Country between us and the *French*.

*Fourthly*. and Lastly, The *Dutch* recovering their losses, and with the help of their Allies, their withstanding both *England* and *France*, of each of them in Order.

The absolute Conquest of the *United Provinces* by the *French*, and their being brought under their subjection is a thing of that dreadful consequence that the very thoughts of it, must needs raise the blood of all

true



true *English men* And there is hardly any remedy too violent for so desperate a cure or means that could be called unjust, if necessary to prevent so great an evil, And therefore instead of loosing time to prove what is so manifest and so obvious to the meanest capacities, I only beg of all my dear Countrymen to lay the present state of things to heart, and humbly move both Houses to consider, whether we be not already too near that evil day, and how far it is consistent with that Interest, with which they are intrusted, to hasten it by unseasonable and pernicious compliance :

*Secondly*, As to our Mastering the *Low Countries*, it can be but one of these two ways :

*First*, Our subduing of them by a Landing ; and withal, beating the *French* out of what they possess already : Or,

*Secondly*, Their voluntary yielding to us, and submitting themselves to his Majesty.

The first can hardly be so much as supposed or imagined by any Rational Man : For 1. If in the midst of their late distractions and the unspeakable confusion, which was in every part of the Country, no opportunity of Landing could be found though often attempted : How can it be expected it should be practicable by the next Summer, now they are all United and strengthened by the assistance of their *Allies*. 2. How can it be thought possible to Land an Army considerable enough to take all their Towns, and Conquer the whole Country ; Nay, to Conquer the Conquerers themselves, and beat the *French* out. 3. Granting that the approach of our Fleet, would occasion a great disorder and consternation in the Country ; and that the *Dutch* should not prove able to oppose our Landing ; and at the same time to keep the *French* out, and defend themselves to the Landwards, what would the consequence of this be, but only to enable the *French* to Master the whole Country, whilst the *Dutch* should divide and draw off their Forces to oppose us ? It being much easier for the *French* who are already in the Country, to March with all their Forces to *Amsterdam*, and to the rest of their Towns, before we can Land ; then for us to prevent them by our Landing. 4. Lastly, if the *French Ships* are to have a share in the Expedition, what Security have we, their men will promote our own ends, and not their Masters ; and that they shall not rather turn tayl against us, if occasion be ?

And

And as to the voluntary yielding of the *Dutch*, and their giving themselves up to us; I may say it is as irrational and as fond a conceit as the other: And which therefore doth hardly need being confuted. But because some of our great men, have (even in Print) made use of this as of an Argument, both to justify the War in point of prudence, and to persuade the Nation to joyn and concur with the *Caballe* in their dark Counsels: It will be necessary, and we owe that respect to their quality, as to lay the matter open and unfold it with a little more care.

Were the *United Provinces* still entire, and untouched and they in an election to joyn with and submit themselves (upon term) either to *France* or *England*, it would be no hard matter to demonstrate and make it to appear that the ballance of true policy and reason should weigh down by much on the *French* side, And that the best part of their Trade would soon, if incorporated with us runn out of their Chanells into ours; which all understanding men amongst them are so sensible of, that in case this were in agitation, the interest of Religion (which besides they could secure some other way) should hardly carry it against profit and self preservation. But not to multiply debates, and granting now that in such a case, the *Dutch* would prefer our Domination before that of the *French*: Let us not examine what might have been if our suppositions were true; but what is like to be *Defacto* & may rationally be expected as the cause stands.

First it must be observed that though their *Maritime Provinces* be farre the most considerable, and those which have made that Commonwealth so powerful and so famous all over the World, yet their *In-Land Provinces*, are of no less importance to the preservation of the whole, and are the Bull-works and out-works of the other, without which the main Body would be soon streightned and brought in a little time to the greatest extremities.

For this reason the *Spaniards* never offered Peace to the *Dutch*, nor could they have accepted of it if offered, till being Masters of Seaven *Provinces*, and having withal conquered several Towns in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, to be a fence to their out *Provinces*, their *Territories* proved of a Competent extent to Lodg and Maintain upon their *Frontiers* the greatest Armies. And by removing the Seat of the Warr from their Trading *Provinces*, be so much the more able to continue it, rather with advantage to them than with the least inconvenience or trouble.

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2. The Second thing we must take notice of is that the greatest advantage of the Situation of the *United Provinces*, lyeth in that several of the greatest Rivers in *Europe*, not only run through their Country, but disimbourg into the Ocean within their Precincts. This openeth them an easy and an advantageous trade into most parts of *Germany*, the *Spanish Low Countries*, and some *Provinces of France*, and makes a Reciprocation of commerce, and as it were an Ebb and Flow, between their Rivers and the Ocean, being enabled by the first to carry at a cheap rate to the furthest parts of the World what goods & commodities the above mentioned Countries afford, and to return them by means of the same, the Richest spoyles of the East and West.

These natural Advantages accruing to the Inhabitants of these respective *Provinces*, by their being all *United* under the same Government, do link and tie them so fast together that nothing but an external and irresistible force can divide them, And who ever comes to be Master of the Rivers must needs in a short time, either be beaten out of his Conquests or else bring all the Havens and all the Inhabitants Bordering upon the Sea, under the same subjection? The Sea Ports without the Rivers, and the Rivers without the Ports, being altogether useles, and a Foundation for an Endless and Destructive Warr.

This being premised, the conclusion will easily be drawn, and since the *French* do already possess half of their Country, and are Masters of their chief Rivers, if the *Dutch* come either to loose the Ambition of Ruling, and being a Sovereign State, or else are brought to the necessity of choosing a Master, It is plain they'l rather submit themselves to the *French King* who hath half conquered them already, and hath in his own hands that part of the Country without which they cannot subsist, than by giving up the remaining part to *England* to entail a Warr upon them, which besides their subjection to Forreigner as well as if they were under the *French*, will exhaust what Treasury they may have left, and from a flourishing Estate bring them to perfect beggary.

To sum up all, it cannot be supposed the *Dutch* will ever choose a Master, and submit themselves to the Government of a Forreign Prince, unless they are Driven to it by an unavoydable necessity: This necessity cannot proceed but from the sense they may have of their own weakness, and of a desire to live in Peace and free themselves of a Warr which is so destructive to them, Now, if they do submit themselves

selves to *England*, in opposition to the *French*, the Peace they seek will be further of then ever, & their remaining Country will be the seat of an endless Warr, whereas, if they do give themselves up to the *French*, they will be United again in an entire body, enjoy rest and peace, and live under the Protection of a Prince, who of all Princes in *Europe* is best able to defend them against all their Enemies and whose interest will be to give all possible encouragement to their Trade and to make their Countrey the Nursery of his Seamen, and in all other respects the support of his Naval Strength. Not to mention that if they must be slaves, first, they might rationally hope to have the satisfaction afterwards, of lending a helping hand to bring their Neighbours, and in truth all *Europe* into the same condition with them.

Thirdly we come now to the dividing and sharing of the Country with the *French*, which by what hath already been said will appear either impracticable or rather hurtful than advantageous, for this sharing must be either by a Conquest on both sides, as the *Dutchies of Cleves* and *Juliers* were formerly, when *Prince Maurice* and the *Marquis of Spinola* entred at the same time into those Countries with tow great Armies, and took each what they could, the one on the behalf of the Elector of *Brandenburg*, and the other of the Duke of *Naxburg*, or else that the *French* having Conquered and possessed all, should give us part of their acquisition.

The first cannot be supposed as long as we have no Army in the Country, And in truth can bring none able to match that of the *French*, and to Conquer as fast as they, though they had not a foot of Ground yet in the *United Provinces*, But as the case doth now stand, it is plain they would be Masters of all before our long Boats could come on Shore.

And as to their giving us a share, after an absolute Conquest, there are three things to be considered, 1. It is worth the inquiry, how farr they are engaged by their Treaty, and what share we are to have: for all appearances are very deceitful, if the *French* have promised to give us any thing more then a fair leave to take what we can. 2. It is apparent by what hath been said before, at what rate their promises and other such engagements are to be valued. 3. The nature and constitution of the Country being such that it cannot stand divided, without not only a very great inconvenience to both parties, but the destruction of one of them. The *French King*, what ever he had prom-

mis'd; cannot be willing to give us such a share as would bring his own under the *English* subject ion. And if his Majesty should have but an inconsiderable part of the Conquest he could neither reap any benefit by it nor protect it against the *French* power without exhausting both his Treasure and his Men. Nay it may be said further, and all that know the Country will grant that unless *Amsterdam* with the *Zuyder Sea* were split and all the shipping divided to have each one half of the whole, no true division can be made, And whoever is Master of that Town will soon or late subdue all the rest.

It is true if we had some Sea Towns, and the *French* had nothing to do with the rest, it might be for a while a Curb to *Holland* and procure us some advantages in Trade. But if the *French* possess all the Country, what proportion can there be between their acquisition and ours? And after the accession of so great a power to their Empire, can any rational man imagin some few places they should give us, would be a ballance to their forces, or a secure fence against their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts?

To clear this further, and to demonstrate how dangerous it is for *England* to destroy the Ballance of *Europe* in hopes of having a share in the Spoil, and of encreasing our Dominions, It is to be considered that in the perusal of our *English* Histories, we find all our Foreign Conquests either unfortunate in the end or an unprofitable charge to the Kingdom; whilst to maintain them, the Seas must be perpetually cross'd, for supplying of them, with Men, Money, and necessaries. Nay, after the Conquest of the best part of the Kingdom of *France* we could not defend it long against the remaining part, And even lost what belonged to his Majesties Royal Ancestors by right of inheritance, after a quiet and uninterrupted possession for some hundreds of years. Since that time what new acquisitions hath been made, hath likewise been returned either for considerable Sums of Money, or upon some other considerations relating to the State of *Europe* in those daies.

And least it might be objected, That those former Conquests were either less prudently undertaken, or harder to be kept than these we seem to go upon now: it is observable first that our Fore-fathers either undertooke a lone the said Conquests or else if the joyn'd with any other Prince (as when they were assisted by the House of *Burgundy*) they still had and kept to themselves the greatest and most considerable share. Secondly That it was ever the interest of some of the Neighbouring

bouring Princes *England* should preserve some part (at least) of the said Acquisitions, and have still a footing on the main, for the Common safety and for the speedier and easier relief of our Allies, And yet though these two conditions mett together either the essential difficulty of the thing it self or our natural unaptness to preserve what we have once gotten, hath made all *European* Conquests unsuccessful, and in truth prejudicial to us.

But the case being thus, what Judgment can we make, and what can we rationally expect or promise our selves of our intended joynt conquest with the *French*, where those conditions before mentioned are altogether wanting? And where first farr from conquering our selves we only countenance and promote (by our streightning the *Dutch* by Sea) the invasion of a Country, which even whilst it was nothing near so considerable as it is now all *Europe* hath looked upon, not only as a fair step, but as the best part of the way to the Universal Monarchy: And which did once occasion so great a confederacy against the House of *Austria* to wrest those Provinces out of their hands, 2. It is as plain, it is not the *French Kings* intrest to give his Majesty a considerable part of the Conquests, nor to let us enjoy long what he might peradventure give us at first for some other ends of his own. And to secure this unknown share to us, I do not see we have now any *Talbots* or Earls of *Bedford* at the head of our Victorious Armies to set up his Majesties Standard in the Conquered Towns, and leave *English* Garrisons in them. But instead of that whilst the *French* march on and do enlarge their Empire, we please our selves with calling the *French* Forces our Forces, And endeavour if not to perswade our selves at least to perswade others All this is done for the honour and glory of the *English* Nation, for the Advancement of Trade, for the safety of his Majesties Person, the support of his Royal authority, And the happiness of his Kingdoms, it is true we do not well know as yet (what) we are to have, but somewhat wel'e have however (say our Great men.) And we will not believe the *French King* shall let us go without a reward, for the paines we take in raising him, as much as in us lyeth, to the Throne of the universal Monarchy. Nay, supposing the worst (saith a great and noble Champion for the *French*, in a Printed Letter to *Sir Thomas Osborn*) that we should be so ill advised, as to let the *French* take all and leave us nothing, yet even in that case, the *French King* would rather make their strength at Sea inconsiderable,



derable, by their being subject to him, than his own more formidable, by his being their Master.

I confess this is a new Demonstration in Politicks which few men would have dreamed of; and if that be all our safety, I hope no true *English* man will be swayed by the authority or quality of those who go about thus to argue the Kingdom out of its liberty, and turn *England* into a *French Province*.

*Fourthly*. The extream danger and fatal consequences of some of the former suppositions, and the impracticableness of the other, being thus (& I hope clearly) demonstrated; we need not loose much time to press that incase (which is the only possible event that remaineth) the *Dutch* shall recover their losses, and with the help of their Allies be able to deal both with *England* and *France*, It cannot be his Majesties interest to continue a Warr which will miserably impoverish his Kingdoms, and by the continual Lessees the *Merchants* do and are like to sustain, bring the Trade of the Nation into such a decaying condition, as will not be repaired in many years of Peace, Especially if *Spain* be further provoked to proceed to an open Breach with us, As it is more than probable, they will ere long be forced to do.

But because I see many are apt to look upon this Warr through a kind of Cloud, and seem to be unwilling to have a distinct Notion of the ill consequences with which it is attended, but reflect only in General and confusedly upon a supposed destruction of the *Dutch*, & some imaginary Advantages accruing to us by it, which yet they cannot instance in; much less demoustrate upon any rational grounds: I think it necessary to add to what we have said already, some few considerations relating both to *Spain*, and the *Empire*.

As to *Spain*, it is first well known what that *Crown* is, to expect from *France*, as soon as these may have any opportunity of destroying them. And I suppose no body doubts but that the *Spanish Courts* will by all possible means oppose the Encrease and stop the Progress of the greatest and formidabest Enemies they have.

2. It is as plain, that in case the *French* come to be Master the *United Provinces*, the *Spanish Neather-Lands* will of Course and unavoidably fall into their hands, notwithstanding the famous Triple League which by the way will be Triple no longer, when the *Dutch* Common Wealth is gone.

3. Although the *Crown* of *Spain* had no Dominions in the *Low Countries*



*Countries*, It would be as much their interest to preserve the *United Provinces*, entire, And in true policy, they ought to venture all their Kingdoms: and to the very last of their men to prevent if it be possible for formidable an accession of Naval Power to the *French*, after which no *Plate Fleet* or *Gallions* could ever come safe, nor consequently their Monarchy stand much Longer.

4. The *Emperor* being already engaged, and hostilities begun between him and the *French*, *Spain* can no longer stand out, and they are bound to run the same fortune as well by late and private Treaties as by the Joynt-interest of their Family.

5. And lastly *Spain* having already by their Assistance given to the *Dutch*, whereby all the considerable Towns in *Brabant*, where preserved, & by the late Attempt upon *Charleroy* so highly incensed the *French* against them, they can venture nothing more by an open Breach, it is much safer for them to declare whilst the hands of the *French* are full, then to be exposed to their fury after their Conquest ended, From all this it plainly Followeth, that a breach between *Spain* and *France* is not to be avoyded, But the same Arguments prove likewise, that, in case we do persist in our Alliance with the *French*, they must break with us as well as with them: And since they are so farr concerned in the preservation of the *Dutch*, they cannot think themselves safe if the others are destroyed.

It is their Interest by making this Warr as destructive to us as they can, to perswade us more effectually, than they could do hitherto into a friendship with their Allies, for to say they dare not proceed to a breach; they are afraid of us, and we know how to Order them in the *West-Indies*: This were good if their *All* did not ly at stake, and if by their breach with us they could endanger more then the same *All*, Whereas to the Contrary by venturing all, they may, and will in all likelihood, save both themselves and all *Europe*.

This Being Granted (as it must needs bee, if truth do in the least prevail with us;) I need not use many words to make all *England* sensible, of the sad consequences of a *Spanish* Warr; I'll hint only those that are undeniable: As first, the seizure of all our *Merchants Estates*, amounting in the whole to a vast Sum. 2. The loss of our Trade with them, which of all other is the most beneficial to the Kingdome; And without which our Wollen goods must lye upon our hands, and half of our *Weavers*, *Spinners*, &c. go a begging.

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3. The Interruption of our *Levant* and *Plantations Trade*, which cannot in case of Breach be secured by ordinary Convoys. And (not to mention the *Spanish Men of War* which both as to number and strength are sufficient to cruise in the *Straits*.) With what either encouragement or safety can our Traders venture abroad; if, besides, the *Dutch Capers*, the Seas come to be infested with *Offenders*, *Biscaines*, *Alajorcans*, and *Minorcans*? Who are none of them inferiors to the *Flushingers*, and are as well Skilled as they in the Art of *Piracy*; Nay, did not these very men without any help take above fifteen hundred Ships from us, in the late *Spanish War*, when *Spain* was at the lowest; and fought alone against us and *France*. 4. By the loss or at least the interruption of our Trade, his Majesties Customs, which is the considerablest Branch of his Revenue, will come to little or nothing; so that to support the War, new Taxes must be raised in lieu of it: And proportionably so much greater Subsidies granted to his Majesty.

If from *Spain* we come to the *Empire*; we find the *Emperor* himself and the *Electors of Brandenburg*, already engaged in the quarrel, and many other Princes upon declaring, so that it is now high time both for the Parliament and all true *English-men*, to look farther then we have done yet, and to examine with more care the consequence of this War. For the Fire which both we and *France* have kindled, is like to consume all *Europe*, if we do not make haste to quench it, and by a timely Retreat give way to safe Counsels. And for a close to this second Part of our Discourse, I desire the following Considerations may be seriously Debated and weighed.

First, What horrid spilling of Christian Blood we'll be the occasion of, if by our willful promoting of the Ambitious designs of the *French* (even so Palpable against our Interest) we force all the rest of *Europe* to take up Arms in their own defence, and to unite all for their Common safety & for the preservation of that Liberty which (as though we were led by Witchcraft) we merrily go about to destroy.

2. How Prejudicial this Warr will be to us, in case the confederate Princesses do over Ballance the Power of *France*; And by raising the reputation and the Credit of the *Dutch* (which last is the only thing they want) enable them not only to pay their *Land-Armies*, but likewise to set out as great and as considerable Fleets as ever. And I do not see that either of them ought to be looked upon as very improbable; since

since first it is very certain; and all those that knew the Country will grant, That if the *Hollanders* had but some prosperous success (either by their own Armies, Or by the help of their Allies) they'l be able to take up without trouble, and in a very short time, as much Money as they may have occasion for, And in the second place it seemeth pretty rational to judg that the house of *Austria* with the conjunction of many Potent Princes, will struggle a while for their lives, and may be hard enough for the *French*.

3. But how much greater will the danger be if neither *Germany* nor *Spain* are able to stop the Progress of the *French*? And in case they must all yield, and submit themselves to the Victorious Armes of the most Christian King, what will become of Poor *England*? must his Majesty, (I speak it with due respect to his Royal and sacred person) be Tennant at will? or else Do we presume so far on our own strength as to imagine we may do what the rest of *Europe* cannot? And that though the *French* had conquered all, we should not fear them the more? and could still defend our selves against them? Let those that have Advised his Majesty to this Warr speak, they must now pull their Vizard off, they must appear in their true shape; & Tell us plainly whether they are paid for making the *French King* the Universal Monarchy, And whether to bring down new Golden showers into their Laps, *England* must at Least be made Tributary to the *French*, some few Hackney writers will not serve the Turn now, And twenty silly stories against *Holland*, cannot make it advisable for us, to joyn with the *French King* against the Greatest part of *Europe*. When this Warr was entred upon, no enemies were [thought on, at least spoken of, besides the *Dutch*: This was the only game we followed at first, And we expected no other prey to divide between us and the *French*. But now, supposing that we had taken never so much care for an equal sharing of the *United Provinces*, concerning which we referre our selves to what hath been said before, will our great men assure us further, That the Lines are also fallen to us in the pleasant places of *Europe*, And that his Majesty is to share the *Universal Empire* with the most Christian King. I grant the *Dutch* have offended us, And that our Warr against them is not unjust. But is it just therefore to destroy so many Princes who cannot Subsist without them, & who for their own preservation are forced to Venture all to preserve the *United Provinces*? In few words the Scene is altered: And though our infinite charity leads us, not to suspect the fir

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terity of the *French* or fear the encrease of their power, most Princes of *Europe* are of another mind; And whatever comes of it; they are resolved to stand by and protect the *Dutch*, as long as they are able to protect themselves; so that to conquer *Holland* All their Allies must be destroyed first: And the *French King* must needs be Master of the best part of *Europe* before we can have to our share either the *Briel* or *Flushing*.

I might Add several other considerations (And perhaps of no less weight then the former) to evidence the fatal consequences of this Warr. But by reason they do relate to the safety and preservation of our Lawes (as well Ecclesiastical as Civil) I forbear, least it should be thought I go about (or intend in the least) to raise a Jealousie between his Majesty and his people: leaving it wholly to the care and wisdom of the both Houses to provide against it, by those means, and wayes as to them shall seem meet and necessary, and as the Importance of the thing it self requireth.

### III.

So farr (I hope we have made good what we have said in the beginning of this Discourse; That this was an age of wonders, And that of those wonders the greatest was the present Alliance with *France*, And our prosecuting the Warr in so dangerous an Association. But since there are no effects so rare or so wonderful, as well in the Civil Government as in the Course of Nature, but have proper Agents to produce them; it is very fit to enquire into the causes of our Mysterious Councils, the better to judge of their true nature.

In order to that, It will not be amiss, to look a little abroad and consider whether the Policy of some other Princes, who are engaged in the same Alliance with the *French* may not be a Leading case for us And help our discovery at home.

Those Princes are the *Bishop of Munster* and the *Electer of Collen*. And as to the first, All the world knows and we have had a sufficient experience our selves how farr Money will go with him. Nay he is so farr honest in this, that he doth think it no shame to own and profess it openly, He is but a Tennant for life, And whatever fills his Coffers, that he takes to be his true interest. The Universal Monarchy doth not intrench upon the Sovereignty of either, his Brothers or Nephews.  
And

And a considerable and rich Legacy is the only Principality he can leave them; Whilst his present Subjects are destroyed, he hoards up Treasuries for his Family, And let the worst come. Some rich Abbeyes in France will bring him more Revenues then his *Bishop* prick, As lately a Northern King did for the like, exchange his Crown, so that the case is clear with him, And if the *States* would out bid the *French*, his Highness would soon forget his Old Quarrells, and prove the best of their friends.

— The next is the *Elect* of *Collen*, who (to do him right) is a Religious and a worthy Prince, And one who in his own nature, is a great lover of peace; But how could he be perswaded then to make his Country the Seat of the Warr? To give his strong holds to a Foreigner? And to expose his Subjects to all the Calamities, which the inquartering of an Insolent Army doth bring along with it. To this the answer is plain, The Softness of his nature, and the easiness of his disposition, hath made him devolve upon his Chief *Ministers* the whole Government of his Dominions, and the absolute direction of his Counsellors, His great favorite (another *Bishop*) is of the same Religion and Principles which that of *Munster* and the Debonarity of the Master, is no fence against the corruption of the Servant, *Quid vultis miki dare & tradam eum vobis*, Nay if the *Bishop* of *Strasbourg* (the said Favorite) doth stick at any hard thing, and is at any time somewhat troubled in his mind; for the undoing of so many thousands of Families, and for betraying his Trust so shamefully, he hath his Brother at his Elbow (the late *Bishop* of *Mentz* a sworn Champion for the *French*, and of whom they used to say in jest (that he was a dear friend to them) ready to comfort thme upon all occasions, and to spur him on with more fury. Thus if you ask, where the Interest of the *Arch Bishop* of *Collen* lyeth in this Alliance with *France*, And how comes it he will suffer his Country to be laid as waste, as if the *Turks* had over run it? Let it not be wondred at, The *French* Pensioners will have it so, And the two Brothers *Fursenburghs* are paid for it.

The Case being thus a broad, I wish our Island might boast of the same happiness as to corrupt Councillors, Which *Ireland* enjoyeth in their being free from all Venimous Creatures, And that no polick Vipers might be able to breath in our *English* Ayre; without soon breathing out their lives, But alas! our Chronicles do furnish us with too many Instances of the contrary, And without looking any fur-

ther back for *Presidents* his Majesty himself and this *Very Parliament* have (not many years since) sufficiently expressed how farr they are of opinion that *Great Ministers* may betray their trust.

On the other side, because some have been guilty, they must not be all indifferently condemned. And we ought to have a great care not to pass a rash Verdict upon Persons whom his Majesty hath irradiated with so many illustrious beams of his Princely favour. The safest way then not to wrong neither the Caball nor the truth, is to take a short survey of the Carriage of the chief Promoters of this Warr, Leaving the Judgment of either their Innocency or their Guilt to the unprejudiced reader.

1. I will not insist much upon some whispers (come to loud talking of late) of the wonderful effects the *French Kings* Liberality had (almost four years since in converting the strongest opposers of his Interest, & though there be many odd passages in it which are come to the Knowledge of several considerable members of both houses) yet being not able my self to lay the whole matter open, and having it only at the second hand, I leave the full discovery of it to the party Concerned, who (I am informed upon the least encouragement) and provided he may do it with safety to his Person will at any time be ready to trace out (in the view & to the satisfaction of the whole world) the first steps towards our undoing, and to shew plainly when the foundation of this Mistry of iniquity was laid.

2. But howsoever whether all that is reported of this be true or not, I suppose it is not usual to see so great a familiarity (as hath been observed long since between Foreign *Embassadors* and First *Ministers* of State, Continual treatings and frequent goings to Country houses, there to stay several daies, and weeks, is a new thing in the World. And an *Embassadors* using so Noble a house with so much freedom, gave a just cause to all observing men to conclude he had paid dear for it. I am sure his Majesty himself was not very well pleased with it at first, Though they have proved pretty successful, in the Art they have used since to reconcile him to their intrigues.

3. We have seen in the first part of this discourse, how farr not only his Majesty, but his Great men likewise thought it necessary to keep a true ballance between the respective Princes and States of *Europe*, and to stop the progress of the *French*. What Steps were first made in order to it and how the *Dutch* were Courted into an Alliance with



with us; jointly to allay the Stormes the disturbers of mankind had raised, and Quench their devouring Flames. Nay, we made it appear the Triple-League was not entred into, out of a personall kindness to the *Spaniards* but only for self preservation, and to prevent the overrunning of Christendom, Whereupon 'tis worth the while to enquire of the same parties, and desire them to inform both houses and the rest of the Nation which way the ballance of *Europe* came to be so much altered; And what hath made the *French* since the Treaty of *Aix* lose formidable than before? hath the House of *Austria* had any new accession of power? or did the Invasion of *Lorain* weaken the most *Christian King*? Could we value our selves four or five years since, by raising high Bancks against some few *French Waves*, and now be as proud again of letting in their whole *Ocean*? The Jeopardy *Europe* was supposed to be in was (most certainly) infinitely increas'd, And the same *Hanibal* is now much nearer to our Gates than ever he was, And yet we never thought our selves so secure; and whilst the Shipp of *Europe* is neere sinking, the *Caballe* (which is the Measure of their faith) no not apprehend the least danger, Happy men who can so suddenly be transformed into new Creatures! Who would not wish to have a share in your enlightening Graces?

But to the matter of fact, by the Treaty of *Aix la Chappelle* all Princes in *Christendom* were invited into the garanta for the greater security & strengthening of the agreement then made between *Spain* and *France*. Pursuant to this (as we have said before) his Majesty sent a Minister to the Protestant Princes in *Germany* to invite them into the Garanty of the said Treaty of *Aix*, or in other words, into the Triple-League. And not long after, upon the same Grounds proposalls were made to several other Princes to draw them into the same League; To which the Duke *Lorain* (with some other that had promised to come in) being very much inclined, and the thing being brought neer a conclusion, the most *Christian King* (who by that time was most manfully working under ground to destroy the Triple League, and who dreaded nothing more then a faster tying of that Gordian knot) to prevent the Association, did very fairly invade *Lorain*, and was neer taking the Duke himself Prisoner.

In this Invasion, there are three or four things that are observable:  
1. Besides the scandal of such an unjust oppression, and the indignation it ought to have raised in all Princes to see a Sovereign Prince thus hunted

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zed out of his own Dominions; nothing could ever give a greater insight into the Ambitious Designs of *France*, nor discover more fully their Intensions, none but an Universal Monarch, can pretend to a right of displacing Princes, and disposing both of their lives and of their Territories, and therefore nothing could deserve a higher resentment; nor a more vigorous opposition from those that had appeared so lately the asserters of the Liberty of *Europe*. 2. This Violence was an open Breach of the *Pirenean Treaty*, and consequently of The Treaty of *Aix la Chappelle*, which was a renewing and a further confirming of the other. And so far the Triple League was concerned in it. 3. It was destructive to the very end and scope of the said Treaty of *Aix*, which was to put a stop to the Progress of the *French* and to the encrease of their Power, the Addition of that fair Dukedome, being as considerable if not more then their Conquest in the *Spanish Netherlands*, And withall Part of the *Spanish* Dominions, either blocked up and Beseiged by it (as *Luxemburg*) or cut off from the rest, and all communication taken from them, as the County of *Burgundy*. 4. The great Zeal which the Duke of *Lorraine* had expressed to joyn with the other Princes engaged in the Triple League, was the true cause why he was thus persecuted; though some other unjust and frivolous pretences were used.

Upon all these grounds, the Duke of *Lorraine* was in good hopes the Triple League would protect his innocency, and not forsake *Europe* by forsaking him. And to quicken them, he sent some of his Servants to the respective Courts of the Parties Engaged. Whereupon our great Men advised his Majesty not to concern himself in the Quarrel, though his own inclinations and love to justice, led him not to refuse his Assistance to a Prince who had laid upon him many great and high Obligations, and especially in an occasion wherein the Liberty as well as the Honour of Christendom was so far concerned. But the Ministers it seemeth, carried it against their Master, and the Duke of *Lorraine's* Envoy was sent back with a Complement and many expressions of kindness, but told withall the *French* Invasion was a Torrent not to be stopped at that time. A Torrent not to be stopped at that time! And what was then the use of the Triple League? what will become of all the fine speeches made in its commendation? and was it harder to oblige the *French* King to return *Lorraine*, then to force him to restore the *French* Counts,

as it was by the Treaty of Aix; in case we had been still true to our Interest, and had been swayed by no other consideration? *Idem manens idem, semper facit idem.*

About the same time, whereas we had sent to several Princes to invite them into the *Tripple League*, the *Emperor* who might as justly have expected the same Compliment, did by a Letter to his Majesty invite himself, and in conformity to one of the Articles of the Treaty of Aix desired to be admitted into the Garanty.

Upon the receiving of the Letter (his Majesty upon whose goodness some of our great Men had not had time to work yet) assured the *Spanish Ambassador* (who had delivered the Letter) he was glad his *Imperial Majesty* was so ready to come into the *League*, and told him he would cause an Instrument to be prepared in order to the said Admission. But when the resolution was taken, and Orders given for preparing the said Instrument. It was first moved that Mr. Secretary *Trevor* (who was not initiated in their holy Mysteries) might not have the drawing of it though it was his proper Province, And then having made themselves the sole Masters of the thing, a tollerable and reasonable honest draught was first brought in, but before it was perfected, they acted their part so ingeniously (with the help of *Monsieur Colbert*) that in the end they possessed his Majesty with the opinion, that the admitting of the *Emperor*, would be attended with very dangerous consequences; and that in case he came into the *League*, his Majesty would be engaged in all his Quarrels and bound to make his Forces March (as the before mentioned Author of the Letter to Sir *Thomas Osborne* expresses himself) into the farthest parts of *Germany*, as often as it should happen to be invaded by the *Great Turk*. The late Secretary *Trevor*, opposed this as much as he was able, and endeavoured to satisfy his Majesty, that the Garanty of the *Tripple League*, as well as of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, related only to the Aggression and other Hostilities from either *France* or *Spain*; *Propterea* (saith the Treaty) *by reason of the said Alliance*. But the wary cautious men (as well as of the greater number) carried it, And the *Emperors* proffer was rejected.

Nay, as soon as some of our *Semi Gods*, had cut the fatal *Triple Knot*, with the *Diamond Sword* of their *Alexander*, the poor now but formerly so vaunted *Tripple League*, was trampled under foot, turned into *Ridicule* and less valued than a *Ballade*: His Majesty and they

they themselves since the Treaty of Aix, had thought it very rational and very necessary withal, to invite other Princes into the said League, or in other words, into the *Garanty* of the Treaty of Aix; pursuant to the VII. Article of the said Treaty, whereby all *Kings, States, and Princes*, are invited into it. But as if they remembered neither his Majesties sending of *Envoyes* to the Princes of *Germany*, nor the words of the Treaty itself: They tell us now (in the same Printed Letter) That the necessity of inviting all Princes into the Triple League, is a *Maxime* much in vogue with some who looking very grave, do therefore take it very ill if for that reason, you will not allow them to be infallible: And afterwards because the Triple League is often mentioned, without mentioning the *Garanty* of Aix, (which is in truth the thing meant by it) to say (saith the Author) we should invite them into the Triple League—That, if you mark, it is such a kind of Figure in discourse, as commonly is called a Bull. *Fidem vestram, Dij imortales.*

4. We have gone yet farther then all this, And the civil applications of the *French*, and their kind entreaties, did so prevail with us, that loathing the very thoughts of the Triple League, and hating almost any thing that related unto it; we suffered an *Agent* of ours, one *Marfilly*, whom we had sent to the *Switzers* to invite them into the *Garanty* of Aix (and who was intercepted and taken Prisoner by the *French*, whilst he was very busie in the execution of what commands he had received not many Months before from our Great-men) to be broken upon the Wheel at *Paris*, although one single word from us would have saved his life. Neither did we take it ill (such is our good nature) that upon the very Scaffold, twenty Questions were put to him relating to his Majesties Person. And (in that publick and infamous Place) a strict inquiry made into the particulars of what had passed between him and the *King of England*, for thus was his Majesty often mentioned and named.

5. But to take off somewhat of the wonder and strangeness of our neglecting, or forsaking our Leagued friends for the most *Christian Kings* sake, we soon shewed as much self-denial in our own concerns and grew civilised to admiration, by our inward converse with the *Monsieurs*, whereof we'll give only three Instances.

The first is that whilst we stormed against the *Dutch*, for not promoting as far as they were bound, the coming away of some Families that

that would leave *Surinam*, we found no fault with the *French*; their keeping us above four years out of *St. Christophers*. No more than with their destroying, in the mean while that part of the *Island* which belonged to his *Majesties Subjects*. And we would have thought it a rudeness in us, to have pressed too hard on his most *Christian Majesty* for a speedy or punctual performance of his *Articles*. Nay if the *French Commanders* in those parts are to be believed, there was a very good understanding in relation to the said *Island*, between some of our *Grandeess* and the *French Court*, as doth appear by the narrative my *Lord Willoughby* delivered to the *Council of Plantations*, and which is Entred in their Books.

The next is, that by any Ordinance of the *French Privy Council*, (which is now the *Statute Law* of that *Kingdom*) all their Sea and Land *Officers*, and *Commanders* in the *Islands of America* being strictly enjoyned and required to secure to their Master the *Sovereignty* of those Seas, the said *Ordinances* having been brought in by a Person of Quality to the *Cabinet Council*, it was at first must declaimed against, but soon buried in oblivion, and put up amongst the useless *Papers*, though the *French* Pursuant to it, have since much interrupted our *Trade*, and have proved infinitely vexatious in so much (as I am credibly informed) that the present *Governour* of *Jamaica* hath sent word since his being there) that notwithstanding their old Quarrell with the *Spaniards* it would be much easier to keep a good Correspondence with them then with the *French* our dear *Allies*.

And for a last Instance of our more then ordinary civility to the *French* several *Traders* in *London* have prepared a *Petition* to his Majesty in Council, to complain of the oppression their *Factors* and *Agents* lay under in *France*, with a true state of their Case and a short account of their greivances, this came to the Knowledge of some of our *Greas Ministers*, and they having had the perusal of them before the delivery of it, stopt by their *Authority* all further prosecution of the matter, and put off the said *Merchants* with a promise they would acquaint the *French Ambassador* with their Complaints, and see it should be redressed through his means. How farr they have been encouraged in their Trade since that promise, they are best able to Judge, but however it was not fit the Nakedness of our dear Friends should be thus exposed to the view of the whole *Council-Board*.

And The foregoing particulars are more than sufficient to satisfy any

any impartial and understanding Reader, how farr the *French* have influenced our *Counsellors*, and with all they give us a great light, and help us much to discern, whether in truth we have broken the *Triple League* (or at least let it fall, and dissolve of it self) for no other reason, but because we were constrained to fall out with the *Dutch*, and to defend our selves against their oppression as the so often cited noble *Author* would persuade us or else if it may not be said rather (and upon much better grounds) that because it was not the *French Kings Interest* the *Triple League* should subsist, we have therefore resolved to break with the *Dutch*, Thus to be subservient to the ends of his most *Christi. an Majesty*.

But by reason this might seem, somewhat harsh at first and be look- upon as too severe a construction of our *Great mens intentions* it is necessary to evidence further how industrious the *Caballe* have been, in their endeavours to make this Warr just (or to be thought so at least) after they had once resolved to make Warr.

Thus they first made a great noise of infamous *Libells*, horrid *Pictures Pillars* sett up and *Medalls* coyned; to the infinite dishonour of his *Majesties* Person and of his *Royal Dignity*, whereas to this day, none of those *Libells* or *Pictures* could be produced, And the *Pillars* had never no being but in the imagination of those who made it their work, to raise a *Jelousie* between the *Two Nations* and set *Europe* in a *Flame*, It is true there was a *Meddal* Coyned which might have been spared, but as soon as it was known in *Holland*, some exceptions were taken at it, the *Stamp* was broken to peeces, and withal all impartial men that have seen in could not discern any thing in it which could give so much offence or that looked like an affront intended to his *Majesty*.

Besides this thinking it very material to have in this as well as in the late Warr, if not the clamour, at least the concurrence of the *Traders*; they sent for several of them and endeavoured to draw from them some Complaints against the *Dutch* for the strengthening of the *Good cause*. Wherein it is very observable that the *Committee* of the *East India Company* being (amongst others) desired to bring in their *Grievances* they answered and gave it under their hands, they knew of no wrong done to them by the *Dutch* since the *Treaty at Breda* (or words to that effect) But it seemeth the Compiler of his *Majesties Declaration* was better informed, And knew more of the *Companies* concerns then their *Committee*.

But



But all this not serving the Turn, the Difficulties which did arise in the performance of the *Conditions* of the Surrender of *Surinam*, must be improved to the height, And even after *Secretary Trevor* had adjusted the matter with the *States*, and had received from them the *Orders* which were agreed upon, *Banisters* going was retarded, and Sir *John Trevors* agreement (as if he had not faithfully discharged his trust in it) submitted to the censure of the Counsel of *Plantations*, where at last the said *Banister* pleaded so well his own and *Secretary Trevor's* cause that with much ado the one was cleared, and the other dispatched away, though with many devices and tricks (too tedious to be inserted here) which (if not prevented) might have made his Voyage altogether unsuccessful: But we must not forget, that, the very men who found so much fault with what *Mrs Secretary Trevor* had done were themselves satisfied with much less, before they had harkened to new Counsells: And were not a little Angry with *Colonel Banister* for desiring more than the *States* were willing to grant. What (was it said at that time) do you think we must make War for you: Or that We are bound to procure you whatsoever may be advantageous, to your self, and to your fellow *Planters*? *Quantom minus ab illo.*

Their next work and (in truth) *Great Master Peice* was the sending the *Yacht*, with *Orders* to Sayl through the *Dutch Fleet*, and require striking to his *Majesties Flag*. And I am so farr from Justifying or excusing in the least the refusal which the *Dutch Admiral* made to pay what respect was due to the *English Colours*, that the *States* themselves do not own it, and are ready to enter into any new *Engagement* for preventing the like for the future, But there are several circumstances in it which are worthy of *Observation*: as, That the *Dutch Fleet* was then at Anchor not farr from their own Coast, and in a Station which by many *Geographers* is accounted no part of the *British Seas*.

2. That the *Dutch* were out at that time in pursuance of the *Triple League*, and to be ready upon occasion to relieve the *Spanish Nether-Lands* which were threatned by the *French*, who were then in *March* with a considerable *Army*, and came as farr as *Dunkerk*, which on: would think was a very unfit time to send out on purpose to pick a *Quarrel* with them: And the rather because we had promised the *Dutch* to set out a *Fleet* as well as they, to joyn with theirs, for the

Common safety. 3. That the *Pensionaire De Witt* who Governed *Holland* at that time with a more then *Ministerial Authority* took a pride in standing upon punctillios in all things relating to *England*, which maketh the *Common Wealth* it self to be less guilty of any disrespect shewed, either to his Majesty, or to the Nation, through the haughtiness and private animosity of their *Minister*. And truly I must needs say, that of all the things that are laid to the said *De Witt* charge, there is hardly any which would make me apt to believe there was a *Private* understanding between the *French* and *Him*, then his carriage in this business, and his demurring so long upon the satisfaction, which the greatest part of the *States* were willing to give to *England*, whilst he knew full well, that it was a Quarrel sought by our *Ministers* who wanted some popular pretence to make *Warr*, and keep their word to the *French King*. 4. That we stayed several months before we demanded satisfaction, Least if we had demanded it too early, it had been granted us too soon. 5. That when *Sir George Downing* was sent over, he was bound by his Instructions not to accept of any satisfaction from the *Dutch* after a certain number of days, which were prescribed to him, which is a very irregular and unusual way of proceeding in *Embassies*, and much less practicable in *Holland* than any where else, It being impossible to have the resolutions of their *Towns* and afterwards of their *Provinces* without a considerable time. 6. That this was made so much the more difficult by our demanding not onely the usual striking, which (though ever practiced and due to *England*) was first *Nationally* agreed upon, in 1654. and confirmed by the two *Treaties* with his Majesty in 1662. and 1667. But also a new kind of acknowledgment of the *Sovereignty* of the *Seas* which is not mentioned in the said *Treaties*. So that by joyning them both in a *Memorial*, if the *Dutch* did demur upon the second & so delayed the *Granting* of the first, it was a ready way for us to clamour and possess the whole *Nation*, the *Dutch* had broken their *Treaty* and refused to *Strike* to the *English Flag*. 7. That after the *Dutch* had given their answer to the said *Sir George Downings Memorials*, he refused to receive it, and came away without it, against a second *Order* he had received under his Majesties own hand, for which also he was *Committed* to the *Tower*. But not to wrong the Gentleman, we must also own, that though he had a positive and latter Command from his *Master*, which did so farre rescind his Instructions, yet his friends have

have whispered in his behalf and for his Justification that he had received at the same time Letters from some of our Great *Ministers* who conjured him as he tendred his own good to follow his *Instructions* and keep close to them. 8. Lastly it is very observable that the *Dutch* having sent by an *Express*, the *Answer*, Sir *George Downing* would not receive, We first replied it was dark obscure and insufficient, Upon which they sent an *Extraordinary Ambassador* who joyntly (with the *Legier Ambassador*, told our *Ministers* that his Masters intentions and desire being to give his Majesty all possible satisfaction in the business of the *Flagg*, they both *Ordered* and *Impowered* him, to clear what might be obscure or dark in their *Answer*, and supply what was insufficient and therefore desired them to instance in what they did not approve of, or did think amiss, or else that they would be pleased to draw up themselves after their own *Methed and way* what *Article* they thought necessary for the preventing of the like inconvenience. They *Answered*, the *States* with their *Ministers* knew best how to Frame and Word their own *Answers*, neither could it be expected they should draw up papers for them. Whereupon the *Dutch Embassadors* brought them a *Project* of an *Article* to be agreed upon concerning the *Flagg*, and asked them whether it was Worded to their mind, and if that would satisfy them, To which they gravely answered, that when they had signed and delivered it they would tell them their mind concerning it, And the *Embassadors* refusing still to signe it, unless they knew before hand it was *Satisfactory*, their conference thus broke off, yet upon second thoughts, the *Embassadors* having resolved to signe the said Paper, and to deliver it at a venture, they demanded a *New Conference*, which was promised them, and Seaven of the Clock at night appointed, on the *Sunday* after the Engagement with the *Smirna-Fleet*. But on the very same day least the *Dutch* might comply further with us then we desired, our *Grandees* did prevail with his Majesty to call extraordinarily a *Counsel* and to have without further delay the declaration of Warr, read & approved. So that When the *Embassadors* came at their appointed time, with their Paper ready signed they were told in short they came too Late.

7. I might Add as many and as considerable instances of what Arts and Policy our great Men have used to deceive his Majesty; And to bring him by degrees into a liking of their War. But this matter

matter being so ticklish and nice, That I fear I should not be able to go through with it (although I took never so much care) without exposing my self to the censure of the World, and having either my intention or some of my expressions misconstrued. I think it much safer and more prudent to draw a *Curtain* over that part of the *Ministry* of the *Caball*, and leave their *Reputation* so far untouched, since they have had the Skill to weave it (as it were) in more then one place into that of their *Master*.

8. For a farther clearing of this and to satisfy our selves, as far as we are able, whether the Construction we do seem to make of the *Carriage* and *Designs* of the *Caballe*, be not to partial, It will not be a mis if we endeavour, to discover what their own Opinion was of it at first, and how far they were perswaded themselves, their *New Counsels* were agreeable to the *true Interest* of *England*, which will best appear by the two following particulars :

The first is, Their great care of not trusting with their *Mysterious Intrigues*, persons, whose either quality, natural Courage, Honesty, or experience, made them suspect they would be either too inquisitive, before they would joyn and concur with them, or else too resty and froward, if they chanced to be of another mind. And upon these fair and honest Grounds, they reformed their *Cabinet Counsel*; and turned at once out of the *Comittee* for *Foreign affairs*, *Prince Rupert*, the *Duke of Ormond*, the *Lord Keeper*, and the late *Secretary Trevor*; This being the first *Secretary of State* that was ever kept out of a Commission of that *Importance*. Not to mention several other eminent and considerable *Privy Counsellors*, who till then had been *Commissioners* in all *Negotiations* and *Treaties* with *France*.

Now in case the *Caballe* had no *Designs* but what were for the honour, and the safety of the *Nation*, why they should so industriously conceal it from persons that have deserved so well both from his *Majesty*, and from the whole *Kingdome*; is what passeth my poor understanding; and whoever is able to untiddie this. *Erit mihi magnus Apollo*.

But if this be no convincing *Argument*, the next I hope will be somewhat plainer; And both Houses are best able to judge, whether their sitting was so dangerous: or how faithful those *Counsellors* must be who could advise his *Majesty* to *Prerogue* so often upon the *French Kings* desire; A *Parliament* whole *Loyalty* and *Zeal* for their *Sovereign*

raign, is to be match'd in no former Age. We do not hear that either the *Geails* or *Walſingham*, ever adviſed the *Queen* their *Miſtreſs*: Not to call her great Council, or ſuffer them to meet, when ſhe was preparing to aſſiſt the *Proteſtants* in *France*, or to *Protect* the *United Provinces* againſt *Phillip* the Second. *King James* had no reaſon to fear his *Parliament*, if they came together, would oppoſe the aſſiſtance of the *Palsgrave*. And his *Majeſty* now Reigning, hath in the former War againſt the very ſame *Enemies*, had a ſufficient experience of the readineſs of both *Houſes*, to promote as far as they are able, any deſign which they conceived, may tend to the honour and ſafety of his *Government*, and to the proſperity of his *Kingdome*. Why then ſhould our *Greatmen* obſtruct the chearful Compliance of his *Majeſties* faithful Subjects. 3. Why not to call upon thoſe whole *Aſſiſtance* was ſo neceſſary, and who never denied it when demanded? Let us not condemn them before we have all. *Parliaments* (I ſpeak it with due Reverence) are now and then *Peeviſh* things that will not be ſatisfied with fair Words, and pry too far into Secrets that are not to come to publick view. Our *Grandeens* were afraid, if ſo many clear-ſighted men came together; ſome one or other would ſpy out the *Snake* that lay in the *Grasſ*, and if their mine had once taken vent, the whole Deſign had miſcarried. No, no, we'll do better (ſaith the *Caball*) we'll be wiſer than to run that hazard; we are reſolved to make War, and will not be croſſed in it by any *Parliamentary* Clamours. If for want of a *Parliament*, we can have no *Engliſh Subſidies*, we'll make a ſhift with *French Supplies*: And if that doth not ſerve the turn (obſerve the Gradation,) we'll ſhut up the *Exchequer*. In the mean while the *Smyrna* and *East India Fleets*, will fall into our hands. And when we have all that *Treaſure*; who ſhall dare to find fault with us.

9. Having brought the *Caball* thus far, we muſt before we part, wait once more on ſome of them as far as *Holland*, and ſo take our Leave of them.

We have already given ſome account in the firſt Part of this Diſcourſe, of the new Agreement entred into with the *French King*, by our *Pleniſpotentiaries*, and demonſtrated the fatal conſequences of the ſame, what followeth will clear it farther:

The wonderful *Progreſs* of the *French* having ſurprized and frighted all *Europe*; Our *Court* (who knew what ſlender proviſion was made

made for *England* in that Conquest) was little less Alarm'd than the rest: And our Grand *Ministers* were dispatched in Post-haste, both to the *Dutch* and to the *French*, their greatest fear, when they went, being least they should come too late, And find the whole *Country* under the *French* Subjection. After their Arrival in the *Hague*, they begun their first Complements to the *States Commissioners*, that were sent to wait upon them with all the *Expressions* imaginable, both of kindness to *Holland*, and of concernment and trouble to see the *French* so far advanced. There they received an account of *Monsieur de Groots* Negotiation, and of the great care the *French* took of his Majesty; which raised such an *Indignation* in them, that nothing would serve their turn, but destroying out of hand, or at least Mastering the *French Fleet*. And from thence removing to the Prince of *Orange* his Camp; they renewed their kind protestations: Assured his *Highness*, That his *Majesties* intention had never been to give way to the Conquest of the *United Provinces*: The most *Christian King* himself, having often times declared he onely intended to humble their *Common-wealth*, neither was it fit to suffer the *French* should go on at that rate. In the end they took upon them, and engaged to do their utmost to bring the *French Court* to be Satisfied with *Maastricht*, and the right of keeping Garisons in the Towns upon the *Rhine*, that belong to the Electors of *Brandenburg* and *Collen*. And that in case the *French* refused to accept of those terms, they would then take new measures with the *States*, and consider joyntly of the best ways, to prevent the destruction of their *Common-wealth*, as well as the dangerous encrease of the *French Power*.

With these fair promises and friendly assurances; they proceeded on their journey to his most *Christian Majesty*, who was some few hours riding from thence; leaving behind them an infinite satisfaction in the minds of all Persons, with great expectation of a happy Change, through their zealous interposition. But what may not the *Royal Eloquence* of a most *Christian King* doe? What, will not his *Golden Word* perswade, after our Grand *Ministers* had been some few days in the *French Army*, they found they were mistaken before, and began to have a clearer apprehension of things. The Negotiation of *De Groote*, with the particulars imparted to them at the *Hague*, was a meer slander for so the *French Court* told them. The encrease of the *French Power* was not to be suspected or feared; they were too gene-



room to abuse it. And therefore after they had left the Prince of Orange, three or four days without News from them, they at last sent him word. The States were to give satisfaction to both Kings jointly: And that neither Crown could or would treat seperately. This unexpected Message did infinitely surprize as well the Prince of Orange, as the States. And his Highness (who had full power given him by the States to Treat and conclude with England) not to be held longer in suspense, answered the Plenipotentiaries, he desired to know what would satisfie both Crowns, and what their respective demands were? Whereupon they sent him the joynt Proposals before mentioned, together with a Coppy of the new agreement they were entred into; concerning which we'll add onely to what hath already been said, these following Queries:

1. Whether they were sent onely to promote the French Conquest; and if not how they could think it advisable, by making the Peace impossible, to force the Dutch (as far as in them lay to cast themselves into the Armes of the French King, and submit themselves to his Domination?

2. Whether they can deny they knew the joynt Proposals tendred to the Dutch should not be granted, since the French demands alone had been unanimously rejected, & in that case, how agreeable it was to the Interest of England to make it impossible for the Dutch to give his Majesty any satisfaction.

3. Whether, they had not received, as well from the Prince of Orange as from the States Commissioners all possible Assurances of the infinite desire they had to see his Majesty return to his former Amity with them, and of their readiness to purchase it, at any rate, that the Condition they were in would bear? If so how faithfully the Plenipotentiaries, discharged their trust in neglecting those proffers, and entering into a New Engagement, which was so Prejudicial to England as we have made it appear?

4. How far those that were joyned in Commission with them did concur with them in their Iudgement, and whether all those considerations, with many other, were not represented to them; And urged by some who had no other end, but to serve their Master faithfully?

5. Whether or no it was for that Reason, they opposed so fiercely,

ly, My Lord *Vicount Halifax* (who came a day or two after them) his appearing and acting jointly with them though *Commissionated* in as full and as ample manner as themselves.

6. Who were those (after my Lord *Halifax* could be kept out no longer) who went privately to the *French Camp* under several pretences, and had still *Negotiations* of their own on foot?

7. Whether they had Order to call the *French King*, the *King of France*, and to name him still before his *Master*, as well as to sit in the first place the *French demands* before those of their *Majesty*; As all this was done in the Copies of the *Agreement* they had made, and of both Kings pretensions which they sent together to the *Prince of Orange* by Sir *Gabriel Sylvius*, And to which we may appeal if the truth of this be doubted?

8 And Lastly how far their Instructions, will justify their standing, in the behalf of the *French*, upon a *Publick Exercise* of the *Roman Catholick Religion* in the *United Provinces*, the *Churches* to be divided, and the *Romish Priests* maintained out of the *Publick Revenue*? As is set down more at large in the second *Head* of the *French Demands*?

Having thus in all uprightness of heart, stated as clearly as I am able the present *Grand case* of the *Nation*, Wherein I may truly say before God and his *Angells*, I have Averred no one thing without *Good Vouchers*, (and such respectively) as the nature of the thing doth bear. It'll end with a few *Summary Hints* of what we have discoursed at Large, and laying in all Humility both my self and these reflections, as well at his *Majesties* as at his *Great Council's Feet*, I begg of them to take into their Serious considerations.

1. *The Natural solid Greatness of the French Monarchy.*
2. *Their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts in all ages with the consequences of the same.*
3. *The great Encrease of their power under their Present King, both by Sea and Land.*
4. *How far it was, not long since, thought fit to stop their Progress; And what stops were made in Order to it, as well as the zeal, with which it was carried on.*
5. *The carriage of the present French Court, and how they have dealt with most Princes of Europe.*

6. *How*

6. How kindly they have used both his Majesty in particular, and the whole Nation.

7. How true they have been to their word, and to their reiterated promises and other Engagements.

8. How faithfully they have performed Articles hitherto. And what security we have, they shall not be still ready to do worse.

9. The necessity of keeping a true Ballance between the European Princes.

10. How dangerous it is to alter that Ballance, when once settled on an a solid Basis.

11. The dreadful consequences of the Conquest of the United Provinces by the French.

12. The impossibility of our Conquering them.

13. The Impracticableness or disproportion of the supposed sharing and division of their Country with the little Advantage and benefit which at the best would accrew to us.

14. How Prejudicial and harmful, would, to the contrary, any possibility and practicable sharing prove, the same being in truth no other than an absolute French Conquest in a disguise.

15. How destructive the present Warr must needs be in the end, in case the Dutch shall be enabled by the assistance of their Allies, to recover what they have lost, and to come out with as considerable a Fleet as ours.

16. How considerable these Allies are and how much Christian blood will be shed by our willful adhering to the French.

17. How unavoidable a breach with Spayn will be, in case we persist in our Alliance with France.

18. And How fatal the consequences of a Spanish Warr.

19. How much greater the danger will prove if the French be able to conquer as well Germany and Spayn as the United Provinces, and that no Confederacie of Princes, how great and how Powerful soever be a sufficient Ballance to their Forces.

20. And lastly, How faithful our Ministers have discharged their Trust in these great Emergences. How free they have been from dependances upon Foreign Courts. How far they have been jealous of their reputation in that particular. What great care they have had of keeping up the Credit and the Reputation of the Triple League, and of their own Masters with

with it. Their Backwardness (not to say worse) in redressing, or at least declaring against all the wrongs done by the French, as well to his Majesty himself as to his Subjects. Their Industrious Endeavours and various Stratagems to engage his Majesty, and the Nation in this Warr, their Engrossing all business of concernment, And concealing the most Important debates and Resolutions from his Majesties Privy Council. Nay their keeping us unseasonably from his great Council, and putting off their Sessions least they might cross their designs. Lastly the carriage of some of them in Holland, and the care they took of the Interest both of England and of the Protestant Religion.

Now I call Heaven and Earth to record this day that I have set before you *Life and Death, Blessing and Cursing*; Therefore choose *Life* that both you and your Seed may *Live*.

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FINIS.

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